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INFORMATION AND THE MARKET FOR UNION REPRESENTATION 
 
Matthew T. Bodie∗ 
 
In its oversight of union representation elections, the National Labor Relations 
Board seeks to create “laboratory conditions” to determine “the uninhibited 
desires” of employees.  Despite its comprehensive regulation of union and 
employer campaign conduct, the Board fails to insure that employees get basic 
information relating to their decision.  This Article proposes a new paradigm 
for the representation decision: that of a purchase of representation services.  
This “purchase of services” model demonstrates that the market for union 
representation lacks the standard features required under economic theory to 
drive information into the marketplace.  The resulting information deficiencies 
may render employees poorly equipped to make their representation decision. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In 2006 unions represented roughly 8.7 million private-sector employees.1  
Although a substantial number, the percentage of private-sector employees who 
are represented by unions has been steadily and seemingly inexorably falling.2  
The pressure of continued losses has driven union leaders to make organizing – 
namely, the recruiting of new members – their top priority.  In 1995, the AFL-
CIO elected John Sweeney on a platform of increased outreach and renewed 
                                                          
∗ Associate Professor, Hofstra University School of Law; Associate Professor of Law, St. Louis 
University School of Law (beginning fall 2007).  A.B., Princeton University; J.D., Harvard Law 
School; LL.M., New York University School of Law.  Many thanks to participants at the 2006 
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and Society Conference.  I am also grateful for comments I received during workshops at Florida 
State, Hastings, Hofstra, and St. Louis University.  Particular thanks go to Kerry Abrams, Anne 
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McClain, Kye Pawlenko, Miranda Perry, Nelson Tebbe, Amy Wax, and David Zaring.  Special 
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throughout the process. 
1 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, News Release, Union Membership in 2006, 
Table 3, January 25, 2007, available at: http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t03.htm 
[hereinafter 2007 BLS News Release]. 
2 At their peak in the 1950s, unions represented more than a third of the workforce .  MICHAEL 
GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (1987); LEO TROY & 
NEIL SHEFLIN, UNION SOURCEBOOK: MEMBERSHIP, STRUCTURE & FINANCE DIRECTORY app. A at 
A-1 (1985).  By 1983, only a fifth of the workforce was unionized; now, only twelve percent are 
union members.  2007 BLS News Release, supra note 1. 
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organizing efforts.3  His tenure has been marked by a greater devotion to 
organizing efforts.4  Despite these efforts, union membership continued to 
decline.  By 2005, there was sufficient disenchantment with Sweeney’s efforts 
that several of the biggest unions in America, including the Service Employees 
International Union (SEIU) and the Teamsters, left the AFL-CIO and formed a 
new coalition specifically focused on organizing efforts.5 
 In many ways, union organizing difficulties resemble the problems faced 
generally by businesses in service industries.  Organizing entails union agents 
working to bring a group of employees under the union’s representational aegis.  
In essence, they are attempting to sell employees on the benefits that union 
representation will bring.  Unlike other services, however, union representation 
must be chosen collectively by employees as a unit. 
 The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) provides the legal framework 
for private-sector employees to choose whether to have this collective 
representation.  Under the NLRA, a majority vote determines whether the 
employees will or will not have a labor organization6 as their representative at 
the bargaining table.7  Although the vote is a collective process, each employee 
must make an individual choice – through a secret ballot – as to whether she 
wants such representation.  The National Labor Relations Board has famously 
likened the representation election process to “a laboratory in which an 
experiment may be conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to 
determine the uninhibited desires of the employees.”8   
 The Board has spent nearly sixty years refining the conditions of this 
laboratory.  Countless Board decisions have parsed what an employer may 
predict about the effects of unionization; what the employer may promise to its 
employees during the pre-election “campaign” period; what unions may 
promise to prospective members; and what effects a misrepresentation will 
have on the parties.  What is notable for its absence, however, is the lack of any 
requirements that certain information be disclosed to employees.  Instead, the 
Board’s primary concern has been curtailing certain types of information that it 
deems to have a coercive or otherwise adulterating influence.  The Board 
implicitly assumes that the campaign between the union (in favor of its election 
                                                          
3 Marion Crain & Ken Matheney, Labor’s Identity Crisis, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1767, 1784-85 (2001). 
4 Id. at 1785 (“Since Sweeney's ascendance to the presidency . . . , the AFL-CIO has made 
significant progress in revitalizing itself through a renewed commitment to organizing.”). 
5 George Raine, Dissident Unions Put the Focus on Organizing, S.F. CHRON., July 31, 2005, at 
E1. 
6 The Act defines a "labor organization" as "any organization of any kind . . . in which employee 
participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers 
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of 
work."  29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2000). 
7 Id. § 159. 
8 General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948). 
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petition) and the employer (presumably opposed to the election petition) will 
generate sufficient information for the employees to make an informed and 
rational decision. 
 This article challenges that assumption.  In evaluating the regulation of the 
representation campaign, both the Board and the majority of commentators 
have based that their analyses of representation elections on the model of a 
laboratory or, in quite a contrast, a political campaign.9  Instead of seeing the 
representation election as the end result of a political campaign, or a scientific 
experiment conducted in the lab, the election should be treated as a collective 
economic decision about whether to engage in a certain kind of activity.  It is, 
in fact, a choice to “purchase” union representation services.  Viewed in this 
manner, it becomes clear that the actors in the “market” – namely, unions and 
employers – may not always provide the information necessary for employees 
to make rational decisions about union representation. 
 In Part I, the article considers the current regulatory framework for 
representation elections.  It discusses the two paradigms that have influenced 
election regulation: the scientific laboratory and the political election.  It then 
explores important academic commentary that has suggested new approaches to 
this framework.  Part II describes why the choice for union representation 
should be viewed as an economic decision, rather than a collective political 
decision or a scientific experiment. Part III discusses reasons to suspect that 
employees are not getting the information they need to make rational economic 
decisions about union representation.  Part IV concludes with initial thoughts 
on addressing the information problems in the market for union representation. 
 
 
PART I: REGULATING THE REPRESENTATION ELECTION 
 
 Under the system established by the NLRA, the representation process 
begins with a petition – filed by employees, a labor organization, or an 
employer – avowing that a group of employees wish to be represented by a 
particular labor organization.  The petition proposes a particular “bargaining 
unit” of employees – namely, a group of employees that are deemed to share 
                                                          
9 See, e.g., Derek C. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections under 
the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38, 68 (1964) (“[R]epresentation elections 
are closely akin to political contests.”); Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union 
Representation Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495, 497 (1993) (noting that 
“election rules bear the stamp of an analogy between political representation and labor 
representation”). 
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collective interests in the terms and conditions of employment.10  The petition is 
generally accompanied by evidence that employees support an election to 
determine the labor organization’s status.  At least thirty percent of the 
employees in the proposed bargaining unit must support an election before the 
Board will process the petition further.11  Pre-election hearings will be held if 
the employer or employees wish to challenge the appropriateness of the 
bargaining unit proposed by the petition.12 
 If the Board determines that the unit is appropriate, it will move ahead with 
a secret ballot election.13  If a majority of the employees casting ballots vote in 
favor of representation, the labor organization is certified as the collective 
bargaining representative for all of the employees in the unit.14  Although 
dissenting employees are not forced to join the union, they may be forced to 
pay a pro rata share of the collective representation costs incurred on their 
behalf.15  Employers or unions can challenge the results of the election based on 
the eligibility of certain voters or conduct that improperly influenced the 
election.16  The Board then conducts an investigation, which may include a 
hearing for the collection of evidence.17  The Director then either certifies the 
election results or voids the results and orders a new election.  These orders can 
be appealed to the five-member Board and then to a United States Circuit Court 
of Appeals. 
                                                          
10 See Uyeda v. Brooks, 365 F.2d 326, 329 (6th Cir. 1966) (citing NLRB v. Ideal Laundry & Dry 
Cleaning Co., 330 F.2d 712 (10th Cir. 1964)).  A bargaining unit can consist of a small number of 
employees with a particular job description, or it can be all of an employer’s employees. 
11 See 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (2006). 
12 Id. § 101.20(a).  At the end of the hearing, the Board’s Regional Director will issue a decision 
about the appropriateness of the bargaining unit.  Id. § 101.21(a).  The parties may ask the Board 
to review this decision.  Id. § 101.21(d).  However, the Board has the final say; the pre-election 
ruling is not reviewable prior to the election.  If the employer wishes to challenge the 
appropriateness of the Board’s ruling after the union has won the election, it must refuse to 
negotiate with the union.  The subsequent unfair labor practice proceedings then provide an 
opportunity for court review.  See American Federation of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940) 
(holding that Board’s orders in election certification proceedings were not final orders subject to 
judicial review); MICHAEL C. HARPER ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 
299-300 (5th ed. 2003) (discussing the process for employer judicial review). 
13 Id. § 101.21. 
14 See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2000). 
15 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2000) (permitting employers to require union membership as a 
condition of employment); NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 744-45 (1963) 
(permitting “agency shop” agreements whereby unions charge non-members for the costs of 
collective representation). 
16 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(a) (2006). 
17 Id.§ 102.69(c), (e). 
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 The NLRA itself does not provide many specifics on regulating the election 
process.  The 1935 Wagner Act18 only provided that the Board designate a 
representative selected by a majority of the unit employees.19  Initially, the 
Board deemed evidence of employee sentiment presented at a hearing sufficient 
to certify a union as representative.20  However, by 1939 the Board had decided 
to require secret ballot elections to determine the will of the majority.21  This 
change was codified in the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments, which provide that 
if a question of representation exists, the Board “shall direct an election by 
secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof.”22  Beyond the need for a 
secret ballot, the NLRA says little about the election or the regulation of the 
period prior to the election known as the “campaign period.” 
 Thus, the regulation of the election process was largely left to the Board to 
implement.  What exactly could be said, and what could not be said?  What 
would be the ramifications of prohibited conduct?  The Board has felt the pull 
of two competing concerns in this area: a concern to protect employees from 
undue influence, and a concern to let interested parties speak their mind.  It was 
clear that under § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, employers could not “interfere with, 
restrain, or coerce” employees who were exercising rights protected under § 7 
of the Act.  If an employer’s campaign activities rose to the level of a § 8(a)(1) 
violation, they were undoubtedly prohibited.  But what about campaign activity 
that might intimidate or coerce employees, but did not violate § 8(a)(1)?  
Congress had chosen to carve out a fairly big chunk of such conduct for 
protection through § 8(c) of the NLRA.  According to § 8(c), “the expression of 
any views, argument, or opinion” could not be deemed to an unfair labor 
practice “if such expression contain[ed] no threat of reprisal or force or promise 
of benefit.”23  However, in General Shoe Corp., the Board established that 
conduct protected by § 8(c) could nevertheless be grounds for setting aside an 
election.  The Board rejected the claim that § 8(c) prohibited the Board from 
relying on conduct other than an unfair labor practice to overturn an election.24  
Since the text of § 8(c) only spoke to the definition of an unfair labor practice, 
the Board did not view it as a limitation on the grounds for overturning an 
election.  Overturning an election was not akin to an unfair labor practice. 
                                                          
18 The NLRA was created by the Wagner Act and has since been amended, most notably by the 
1947 Taft-Hartley Act. 
19 See Becker supra note CB1, at 507.   
20 Id. (noting that for the Board’s first five years roughly a quarter of all unions were certified as 
representative without an election). 
21 Cudahy Packing Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 526 (1939). 
22 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (2000). 
23 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2000). 
24 General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948). 
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 Having established a broad range of potential regulation, the Board has 
embarked on a circuitous journey of campaign regulation.  As noted above, 
however, the twin concerns of freedom from coercion and freedom of 
expression have marked the Board’s path.  Each concern has become manifest 
in paradigms used by the Board in making their regulatory policies: the 
paradigms of laboratory conditions and political elections.  These two 
paradigms are considered more specifically below. 
 
A. The Laboratory Conditions Model 
 In General Shoe Corp., the Board established that "[i]n election 
proceedings, it is the Board's duty to provide a laboratory in which an 
experiment may be conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to 
determine the uninhibited desires of employees."25  As noted above, General 
Shoe made it clear that unfair labor practices would not be the sole grounds for 
overturning an election.  The case was not merely about the statutory 
application of § 8(c) in the election context, however.  It set forth a standard, a 
model, even a philosophy, about how to regulate the representation campaign.  
The metaphor is one of scientific process: a “laboratory” for an “experiment” 
with “conditions as nearly ideal as possible” to determine the “uninhibited 
desires” of employees.  In deciding whether to invalidate an election, the Board 
stated that “our only consideration derives from the Act which calls for freedom 
of choice by employees as to a collective bargaining representative.”26   
 The laboratory conditions model has led to policies designed to prevent 
undue influences on employees.  Three of these policies – prohibitions against 
coercion, promises or grants of benefits, and inflammatory appeals – are 
discussed below.   
 1. Coercion.  The Board’s prohibitions against employer coercion in the 
election context build on § 8(a)(1) of the Act, which makes it an unfair labor 
practice for employers “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the 
exercise of [their collective bargaining] rights.”27  Any effort to compel the 
employee to vote a certain way is deemed not only an infringement on the 
laboratory conditions but also a trespass against employees’ protected rights.  
Although threats of physical violence are certainly prohibited, the more 
common concern is threats of economic coercion by the employer.  An 
employer may not threaten to fire employees or change their working 
                                                          
25 General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948). 
26 Id. at 126 (quoting P.D. Gwaltney, 74 N.L.R.B. 371 (1947)).  This sentiment is probably based 
on the Act’s Findings and Policies Section, which states that one of the declared policies of the 
Act is to “protect[] the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and 
designation of representatives of their own choosing . . . .”  29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000). 
27 Id. § 158(a)(1). 
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conditions if they support the union.28  A threat to close a plant because of 
union activity is also prohibited.29 
 However, the line becomes fuzzier when an employer is trying to convince 
employees of the negative consequences of union representation.  The employer 
is permitted to inform employees about the employer’s views on unionization, 
and unionization may in fact lead to certain events that would make it more 
likely for the employer to close a plant, perhaps out of economic necessity.  
Such information would be important, perhaps critical, to an employee’s 
representation decision.  But an employer could easily frame threats and other 
coercion as campaign “predictions.”  Because the employer has the ultimate 
control over the fate of the plant, the employer’s prediction looks more like a 
threat.  Thus, any regulation in this area must balance the free speech rights of 
the employer with the rights of employees to be free from economic coercion. 
 The Supreme Court broadly demarcated the boundaries of threat and 
prediction in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.30  The Court held that “an employer 
is free to communicate to his employees any of his general views about 
unionism or any of his specific views about a particular union, so long as the 
communications do not contain a threat of reprisal or force or promise of 
benefit.”31  An employer may even make a prediction about the impact 
unionization would have on the company.  However, such a prediction “must 
be carefully phrased on the basis of objective fact to convey an employer’s 
belief as to demonstrably probable consequences beyond his control or to 
convey a management decision already arrived at to close the plant in case of 
unionization.”32  Any hint that the “prediction” is instead a statement about 
what an employer might do solely on its own initiative would render such a 
prediction impermissible. 
 In practice, the difference between permissible predictions and unlawful 
threats has often rested on “fine distinctions.”33  Generally, an employer is 
allowed to make purely objective statements about what has happened in other 
unionized companies or what the employer’s customers have stated with regard 
to the effects of unionization.34  However, any interpretation of such “facts” that 
casts unionization in a negative light is apt to turn the prediction into coercion.  
The Board and the U.S. Circuit Courts have often differed on where this line is 
                                                          
28 See E.W. Grobbel Sons, 322 N.L.R.B. 304 (1996) (holding that a discontinuance of benefits 
was an unlawful reprisal). 
29 However, the employer may in fact shut down the plant after the election.  Textile Workers v. 
Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 274 n.20 (1965). 
30 395 U.S. 575 (1969). 
31 Id. at 618. 
32 Id.   
33 PATRICK HARDIN & JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 131 (4th ed. 2001). 
34 Id. at 130-31. 
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to be drawn.  For example, in DTR Industries, the Board found that an 
employer violated § 8(a)(1) through its pre-election letter which stated “our 
business would automatically be reduced if the union wins the election.”35  
However, the Sixth Circuit refused enforcement, finding the letter to be a 
permissible prediction based on objective fact.36 
 The Board has also found predictions about the futility of union organizing 
are generally impermissible threats.  The Board reads such predictions as 
threats to engage in bad-faith bargaining and therefore threats to engage in 
illegal activity.37  However, employers are permitted to describe their own 
rights and remedies under the NLRA, even if such descriptions paint a gloomy 
picture of unionization.  For example, in what might be characterized as the 
“bargaining from scratch” argument, employers may tell employees that they 
are not required to agree to anything when bargaining with the union, and that 
they have as much a right to ask for wage and benefit reductions as the union 
has to ask for increases.38  However, an employer may not use this assessment 
as a threat to bargain in bad faith or a threat to reduce benefits illegally prior to 
bargaining.39  Similarly, an employer may offer an opinion about the possibility 
of union-called strikes, and may note that it has the right to permanently replace 
employees who go out on strike.  Predictions of violence are also prohibited if 
depicted as the inevitable consequence of unionization.  However, the Board 
has upheld an employer’s right to state during a campaign that the union might 
send someone out to break employees’ legs in order to collect dues.40 
 Ultimately, there is no clear line between impermissible threats and 
permissible campaign rhetoric.  The Board has emphasized the need to look at 
the totality of the circumstances in figuring out where employer campaign 
conduct falls.  If the overall campaign has had a tendency to threaten employees 
with possible violations of their collective rights, then the Board will find a § 
8(a)(1) violation and overturn the election.  However, such determinations, 
based as they are on a multi-factor contextual test, will be subject to 
indeterminacy and uncertainty.  As such, they threaten either to under-deter 
coercive threats or over-deter the provision of information that may be material 
to the employees’ decision. 
 2. Promises and Grants of Benefits.  In keeping with its efforts to protect 
the “uninhibited desires” of employees, the NLRA also prohibits bribery.  The 
                                                          
35 DTR Industries, Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 833 (1993), enforcement denied, 39 F.3d 106 (6th Cir. 
1994). 
36 DTR Industries , Inc., v. NLRB, 39 F.3d 106, 115 (6th Cir. 1994). 
37 See, e.g., American Greetings Corp., 146 N.L.R.B. 1440, 1445 n.4 (1964). 
38 See Fern Terrace Lodge of Bowling Green, 297 N.L.R.B. 8 (1989). 
39 See, e.g., Golden Eagle Spotting Co., 319 N.L.R.B. 64 (1995); Advo Systems, 297 N.L.R.B. 
926 (1990). 
40 Sears Roebuck & Co., 305 N.L.R.B. 193 (1991).   
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employer may not promise to better employees’ terms and conditions in 
exchange for support of or opposition to the union.  In a famous passage, the 
Supreme Court described the rationale for the prohibition this way: 
 
The danger inherent in well-timed increases in benefits is the 
suggestion of a fist inside the velvet glove.  Employees are not 
likely to miss the inference that the source of benefits now 
conferred is also the source from which future benefits must 
flow and which may dry up if not obliged.41 
 
 The Board and the courts have interpreted § 8(a)(1) to prohibit 
suspiciously-timed benefits even when no strings are explicitly attached.  In 
order to provide its employees with improved terms of employment during the 
course of the representation campaign, the employer must show that its actions 
were motivated by factors other than the campaign.42  Clear evidence that the 
employer had been planning such an improvement before notice of the 
campaign will allow the employer to proceed.  But if the benefit is 
discretionary, and the employer’s decision not dictated by its previous behavior, 
the Board may very well find an implicit attempt to interfere with the 
campaign.  So too may efforts by an employer to solicit or remedy employee 
grievances be deemed impermissible interference.43  The Board has determined 
that suggestion boxes and employee hotlines may amount to an implied 
promise to remedy employee grievances and thereby would be impermissible 
under § 8(a)(1).44  However, it should also be noted that any efforts to scale 
back on benefits that would have otherwise been granted (absent the campaign) 
would also be a § 8(a)(1) violation.  Thus, employers must tread carefully in 
this area: they may be liable for both decisions to grant benefits and decisions 
not to grant benefits, depending on the circumstances. 
 Union promises about securing certain terms and conditions have been held 
to be permissible, since employees, in the Board’s view, recognize that such 
promises are “dependent on contingencies beyond the Union’s control.”45  
However, unions are not permitted to offer tangible, valuable benefits to 
employees in the context of a representation campaign.  Elections have been 
invalidated after union gifts of life insurance coverage,46 jackets,47 hats and 
                                                          
41 NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964). 
42 American Sunroof Corp., 248 N.L.R.B. 748 (1980), enforced in part, 667 F.2d 20 (6th Cir. 
1981). 
43 See, e.g., Bell Halter, Inc., 276 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1985). 
44 See Torbitt & Castleman, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 907 (1996). 
45 Smith Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 1098, 1101 (1971). 
46 Wagner Elec. Corp., 167 N.L.R.B. 532 (1967). 
47 Owens-Illinois, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 1235 (1984). 
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shirts,48 and alcoholic drinks.49  Here, too, however, there has been 
indeterminacy.  One court ruled that a union’s promise to hold “the biggest 
party in the history of Texas” if it won was an impermissible inducement,50 
while another held that a promise of a victory dinner dance was not 
objectionable.51  The Board and the courts have also wrestled over the 
permissibility of union lawsuits against employers on behalf of employees in 
the midst of a representation campaign.52 
 Union offers to waive employee initiation fees have received sustained 
scrutiny from the Board and the courts.  The basic principle was established in 
NLRB v. Savair Manufacturing Co.,53 which held that unions cannot offer to 
waive initiation fees for employees who sign authorization cards before an 
election.54  The Court held that such a practice would allow the union to “buy 
endorsements and paint a false portrait of employee support during its election 
campaign.”55  However, the Court’s ruling did allow for the waiver of initiation 
fees more generally: specifically, the waiver had to be open “not only to those 
who have signed up with the union before an election but also those who join 
after the election.”56  As a result, the Board and circuit courts have been left to 
parse exactly what a union may say in conveying the waiver during the 
campaign.  The Board and the Seventh Circuit found the union’s waiver 
unobjectionable when it stated that it “usually does not charge an Initiation 
Fee” until some time after the election, despite the “usually.”57  However, when 
a union offered to waive fees only to “charter members” without explaining the 
term,58 or said that fees would be waived for “anyone joining now, during this 
campaign,”59 such promises were held to violate laboratory principles.  The 
Board permits unions to clarify or correct objectionable waiver offers but holds 
them to a fairly high standard of clarity.60 
                                                          
48 NLRB v. Shrader’s, Inc., 928 F.2d 194 (6th Cir. 1991). 
49 Revco D.S. v. NLRB, 830 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1987). 
50 Trencor, Inc. v. NLRB, 110 F.3d 268, 272 (5th Cir. 1997). 
51 NLRB v. L & J Equipment Co., 745 F.2d 224 (3d Cir. 1984). 
52 See, e.g., Nestle Ice Cream v. NLRB, 46 F.3d 578, 584 (6th Cir. 1995) (concluding that union 
lawsuit on behalf of employees for overtime pay was an impermissible bribe). 
53 414 U.S. 270 (1973). 
54 Id. at 277. 
55 Id.  
56 Id. at 272 n.4. 
57 Certain-Teed Products Corp. v. NLRB, 562 F.2d 500 (7th  Cir. 1977), enforcing 225 N.L.R.B. 
971 (1976). 
58 Inland Shoe Mfg. Co., 211 N.L.R.B. 724 (1974). 
59 Crane Co., 225 N.L.R.B. 657 (1976). 
60 See, e.g., Claxton Mfg. Co., 258 N.L.R.B. 417 (1981) (holding that letter promising no 
initiation fees “as of this day” was too ambiguous to clarify earlier impermissible waiver offer).  
An interesting twist on the Savair line of cases involves one union’s requirement that a majority 
of employees prepay a reduced initiation fee and one month’s dues in order for the union to file 
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 3. Inflammatory appeals.  As part of the laboratory conditions doctrine, the 
Board prohibits appeals to racial prejudice or pride that it deems too 
“inflammatory” for the campaign.  The seminal case in this area is Sewell 
Manufacturing Co.,61 in which the employer appealed to racial prejudice in its 
anti-union campaign efforts.  The employer linked the union to unrelated 
desegregation efforts and used a picture of a white union official dancing with a 
black woman in its campaign literature.62  The Board found such conduct to be 
grounds for a new election.  According to the Board, racial appeals were only 
permissible if they were truthful, germane to the election, and not overly 
inflammatory.63 
 The Sewell standard has resulted in a hodge-podge of rulings that, as in 
other areas, lack the clarity and coherence necessary for uniform application.  
The Board has generally applied a more lenient standard to appeals of racial 
pride and solidarity; indeed, such appeals may be a legitimate part of an effort 
to improve terms of pay and working conditions.64  However, the U.S. Courts 
of Appeal have been less forgiving and have clashed with the Board about such 
campaign tactics.65  The Board has also generally held that appeals to racial 
prejudice have to be “sustained” in order to meet the prohibited threshold, 
causing further disagreement.  Here too circuit courts have been more willing to 
overturn elections based on racist remarks despite the Board’s willingness to 
tolerate limited instantiations of such behavior.66  The vague standards, 
                                                                                                                                             
an election petition.  Aladdin Hotel Corp., 229 N.L.R.B. 499 (1977).  If the union lost the 
election, the prepaid amounts were forfeit to the union in order to pay for the costs of the 
campaign.  If the union won the election, it opened up the reduced initiation fees to all employees 
for a period of time after the election.  The Board, in a 3-2 decision, upheld the policy, finding 
that it offered the reduced initiation fee before and after the election.  Id. at 500.  In dissent, two 
members argued that the lock-in and forfeiture provisions would interfere with employees 
freedom of choice.  Id. at 501-02 (Members Penello and Walther, dissenting).  The Ninth Circuit 
declined to enforce the Board’s order after finding the union’s letter to be ambiguous as to the 
timing of the waiver offer.  NLRB v. Aladdin Hotel Corp., 584 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1978). 
61 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962). 
62 Id. at 67. 
63 Id. at 71-72. 
64 See, e.g., Baltimore Luggage Co., 162 N.L.R.B. 1230, 1233-34 (1967) (noting that appeals to 
racial unity may be “directed at undoing disadvantages historically imposed” and may be a way 
to “unify groups of employees by focusing group attention on common problems”). 
65 See, e.g., NLRB v. Schapiro & Whitehouse, 356 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1966) (refusing to enforce 
bargaining order because of appeals to racial pride); KI (USA) Corp. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 256, 260 
(6th Cir. 1994) (denying enforcement of a bargaining order based on the union’s use of a letter by 
a Japanese businessman which allegedly inflamed racial tensions); Case Farms v. NLRB, 128 
F.3d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1991) (Willams, J., concurring in judgment) (expressing “concern with 
the Board's apparent disregard for the decisions of the Circuit Courts” in matters of concerning 
inflammatory racial appeals). 
66 See, e.g., M&M Supermarkets v. NLRB, 818 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1987); NLRB v. Eurodrive, 
724 F.2d 556 (6th Cir. 1984); NLRB v. Triplex Mfg. Co., 701 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1983).  Cf. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INFORMATION AND THE UNION REPRESENTATION MARKET           12 
 
 
combined with the concern that legitimate speech may be prohibited, have led 
to calls for reform of this doctrine.67 
 
B. The Political Election Model 
 In resolving representation campaign questions, the Board uses the 
laboratory conditions model as its express paradigm.68  However, courts and 
commentators have pointed to another paradigm that also influences the 
Board’s approach: that of a political campaign.  This is no accident.  Supporters 
of the Wagner Act, including Senator Wagner himself, used the metaphor of 
“workplace democracy” in their rhetoric.69  Linking unionization to such 
American ideals as democracy, representation, and freedom of choice served to 
rebut concerns that the Wagner Act violated free-market principles and was 
therefore anti-American.70  As a result, the notion of political democracy, not a 
clinical laboratory, served as the foundation for the Act. The Act itself 
highlights this in its preamble, which describes the Act as “protecting the 
exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and 
designation of representatives of their own choosing.”71 
 The rhetorical emphasis on workplace democracy carried over into the 
procedural specifics.  Just as representatives are elected through secret ballot 
elections, so would workers select their representatives.  The NLRA initially 
provided that employees would choose their representatives through secret 
ballot elections or “any other suitable method to ascertain [sic] such 
                                                                                                                                             
Clearwater Transport, Inc. v. NLRB, 133 F.3d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 1998) (voicing a “strong 
objection” to the NLRB’s “seemingly casual reading” of past precedent in such cases). 
67 See, e.g., Shepard Tissue, Inc., 326 NLRB 369, 369-73 (1998) (Gould, Chairman, concurring) 
(arguing for a new approach to the Sewell doctrine). 
68 The “FLB-NLRB” database on Westlaw, which includes NLRB administrative law judge 
decisions from 1990, Board decisions from 1935, and related federal court decisions, finds 852 
decisions using the term “laboratory conditions.” 
69 For example, Senator Wagner stated during Congressional hearings, “That is just the very 
purpose of this legislation, to provide industrial democracy.” National Labor Relations Board: 
Hearings on S. 1958 Before the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 
642 (1935) [hereinafter 1935 NLRA Senate Hearings] (statement of Harvey J. Kelly, American 
Newspaper Publishers Association), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 1617, 2028.  See also 79 CONG. REC. 9691 (1935) 
(statement of Rep. Withrow), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL 
LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, supra, at 3132 (noting that “self-government through fairly chosen 
representatives” was an "inherent" American right); Senator Robert F. Wagner, Address Before 
the National Democratic Forum (May 8, 1937), quoted in Leon H. Keyserling, Why the Wagner 
Act?, in THE WAGNER ACT: AFTER TEN YEARS 5, 13 (Louis G. Silverberg ed., 1945) (“[T]here 
can be no more democratic self-government in industry without workers participating therein, 
than there could be democratic government in politics without workers having the right to 
vote.”). 
70 Becker, supra note CB1, at 496. 
71 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000). 
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representatives.”72  Even though the Wagner Act did not originally provide for 
the secret ballot election as the sole means of establishing an employee 
representative, Wagner assumed such elections in defending the Act during the 
hearings.73  The Taft-Hartley Act eventually codified the secret ballot as the 
sole means of selection.74 
 Courts and commentators have latched on to the political campaign as the 
salient analog to the union election campaign.  In its review of election 
procedures and employer speech, the Supreme Court has characterized the 
employee’s choice as the equivalent of a political election.75  Moreover, 
numerous commentators have either made the comparison directly76 or noted 
the comparison made by others.77  The undercurrent of this analogy is most 
likely responsible for some of the contradictions and anomalies we see in Board 
regulation of the election campaign.  Below I discuss three examples of policies 
that seem to derive their justification from the political election analogy: the 
employer as “candidate,” misrepresentations, and information regulation and 
disclosure. 
 1. Employer as Candidate.  In a political election, two or more candidates 
compete against each other to win a particular position.  If only one candidate is 
running, the election is uncontested.  The union election thus runs into a 
particularly thorny problem if it is to be analogized to a political election: there 
is generally only one union seeking to represent the employees. 
 This dissonance has been resolved by treating the employer as a party to 
and, in some ways, as a competing candidate to the union in the election.  The 
                                                          
72 Original NLRA § 9(c), 49 Stat. at 453. 
73 1935 NLRA Senate Hearings, supra note NLRAH, at 642 (statement of Harvey J. Kelly, 
American Newspaper Publishers Association), reprinted in 2 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note NLRAH, at 1617, 2028 (“[A]s to ... representation of the workers you cannot have any 
more genuine democracy than this. We say under Government supervision let the workers 
themselves ... go into a booth and secretly vote, as they do for their political representatives in a 
secret ballot, to select their choice.” (Senator Wagner speaking)). 
74 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (2000). 
75 See, e.g., NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 331 (1946) (comparing the process for 
challenging ineligible voters under Board rules to the process used in political elections); Thomas 
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 546 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The necessity for choosing 
collective bargaining representatives brings the same nature of problem to groups of organizing 
workmen that our representative democratic processes bring to the nation.”). 
76 See, e.g., Bok, supra note DB1, at 68 (“[R]epresentation elections are closely akin to political 
contests.”); Shawn J. Larsen-Bright, Note, Free Speech and the NLRB’s Laboratory Conditions 
Doctrine, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 204, 206 n.11 (2002) (“In this way, representation elections mirror 
political elections.”). 
77 Becker, supra note CB1, at 497 (noting that “election rules bear the stamp of an analogy 
between political representation and labor representation”); Alan Story, Employer Speech, Union 
Representation Elections, and the First Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 356, 415 
(1995) (noting that representation elections have been “reconceptualized as analogous to political 
elections”). 
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Board has always treated employers as parties to an election: they can file 
representation petitions, file objections to bargaining unit, the eligibility of 
voters, and the conduct of the campaign.  Employers are permitted, along with 
union representatives, to place an observer at the polls to monitor the election.78  
In addition, the Board has permitted the employer to campaign vigorously 
against the union in the manner akin to a candidate.  After passage of the 
Wagner Act, the Board initially prohibited employers from campaigning 
against the union.79  As the Board noted, “An election is not a contest between a 
labor organization and the employer of the employees being polled, and 
participation by an employer in a preelection campaign as if he were a 
contestant is an interference with the employees’ rights . . . .”80  However, as 
one commentator has noted, “the creation of an electoral contest in which one 
party could campaign while the other had to remain silent contradicted 
traditional notions of political freedom.”81  The employer’s ability to campaign 
was characterized as a First Amendment issue – the right of the employer to 
free speech.  In 1945, the Supreme Court sustained the union’s rights of speech 
against state interference and then went on to establish that both unions and 
employers had parallel rights of speech.82  The Taft-Hartley Act codified this 
notion of an employer’s free-speech rights in § 8(c) of the Act.83 
 The notion of the employer as the competing candidate against the union 
has become ingrained in our view of the representation campaign.  It has been 
used to support the notion of greater employer involvement in the campaign, 
and greater freedom by the employer to express its views.84  Other 
commentators have attacked the notion that the employer deserves a voice in 
the process, pointing to the irrelevance of the employer’s views and the 
likelihood of coercion.85  Nevertheless, the role of the employer in the process 
                                                          
78 Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 23 N.L.R.B. 26, 31 n.3a (1940), enforced, 120 F.2d 505 (3d Cir. 
1941), enforcement denied on other grounds, 316 U.S. 31 (1942). 
79 See, e.g., American Tube Bending Co., 44 N.L.R.B. 121, 133-34 (1942), enforcement denied, 
134 F.2d 993 (2d Cir.). 
80 Id. at 132. 
81 Becker, supra note CB1, at 541. 
82 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537-38 (1945). 
83 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2000). 
84 Commentators have, for example, argued in favor of retaining the election, as opposed to card-
check certification, based on the employer’s interest in having its views heard during the 
campaign.  GETMAN ET AL., supra note JG1, at 136 (“The concept that each party should have a 
roughly equal opportunity to persuade the voters is fundamental to the democratic process.”).  
See also Larsen-Bright, supra note SLB1, at 242-43 (arguing that the laboratory conditions 
doctrine unconstitutionally infringes on an employer’s right to free speech). 
85 See Becker, supra note CB1, at 577-601 (arguing the political election analogy is misplaced 
and allows employer coercion); Story, supra note AS1, 436-55 (arguing that employer speech is 
inherently coercive and should be regulated in the interest of greater employee freedom); Kate E. 
Andrias, Note, A Robust Public Debate: Realizing Free Speech in Workplace Representation 
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is clearly fixed and seems best explained by the analogy to the political 
election. 
 2. Misrepresentations.  The Board’s overall approach to misrepresentations 
has been consistent – consistently uninterested.  The Board has never wavered 
from its position that misrepresentations per se are not prohibited during the 
election campaign.  As the Board noted, “exaggeration, inaccuracies, half-
truths, and name calling, though not condoned, will not be grounds for setting 
aside an election.”86  The Board stated: “absolute precision of statement and 
complete honesty are not always attainable in an election campaign, nor are 
they expected by employees.”87  Thus, unlike the strict rules of truthfulness in 
such contexts as the corporate proxy contest,88 the Board has taken a relatively 
relaxed approach to misrepresentations throughout its history. 
 However, the Board has oscillated at the fringes.  From 1962 to 1977, the 
Board prohibited a subset of misrepresentations that it felt had a particularly 
nefarious effect on the representation campaign.  The rule, established in 
Hollywood Ceramics Co.,89 stated: 
 
[A]n election should be set aside only where there has been a 
misrepresentation or other campaign trickery, which involves a 
substantial departure from the truth, at a time which prevents the 
other party or parties from making an effective reply, so that the 
misrepresentation, whether deliberate or not, may reasonably be 
expected to have a significant impact on the election.90 
 
Although Hollywood Ceramics did prohibit some forms of misrepresentation, 
its scope was rather limited. The election would be upheld if the 
misrepresentation concerned an unimportant matter or had no significant 
impact or was made at a time that allowed for effective rebuttal or correction.  
A misrepresentation would also be insufficient to overturn the election if it was 
so exaggerated as to be unbelievable or if employees had sufficient information 
already to permit them to evaluate the misrepresentation properly.91 
 The Board overruled Hollywood Ceramics in its 1977 Shopping Kart 
decision.92  Noting that the Hollywood Ceramics rule had been criticized for its 
                                                                                                                                             
Elections, 112 YALE L.J. 2415, 2453-62 (2003) (arguing for stronger prohibitions on employer 
speech to better protect employee freedom of speech). 
86 Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 226 n.6 (1962). 
87 Id. at 223. 
88 See SEC Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2006). 
89 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962). 
90 Id. at 224. 
91 Id. 
92 Shopping Kart Food Market, 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977). 
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vagueness and indeterminacy, the Board argued that such attention to campaign 
propaganda was unnecessary.  In fact, it argued that “Board rules in this area 
must be based on a view of employees as mature individuals who are capable of 
recognizing campaign propaganda for what it is and discounting it.”93  To hold 
otherwise would be to countenance “a view of employees as naive and 
unworldly whose decision on as critical an issue as union representation is 
easily altered by the self-serving campaign claims of the parties.”94  A year 
later, the Board reversed course, and a three-member majority in General Knit 
of California returned to the Hollywood Ceramics standard.95  Four years later, 
however, the hands-off policy of Shopping Kart was yet again reinstated by a 
three-member Board majority in Midland National Life Insurance Co.96  After 
reviewing the history of the Board’s treatment of misrepresentations,97 the 
Midland majority argued in favor of the bright-line, no-policing standard, citing 
the “many difficulties attending the Hollywood Ceramics rule,” as well as the 
need for “the certainty and finality of election results.”98 
 The decision in Midland remains the law.  Some circuit courts, however, 
have been rather grumbling in their acceptance of the Midland standard.  In 
NLRB v. New Columbus Nursing Home,99 the First Circuit endorsed the Board’s 
holding below, but noted that “we do not necessarily endorse application of the 
Midland rule to situations involving charges of more fundamental and clear-cut 
misrepresentations.”100   Noting that the Board had “a duty to provide 
reasonably for the employees’ unhampered freedom of choice,” the court held 
that a strict adherence to Midland might, in some cases, constitute legal error.101  
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has held that “[t]here may be cases where no 
forgery can be proved, but where the misrepresentation is so pervasive and the 
deception so artful that employees will be unable to separate truth from untruth 
and where their right to a free and fair choice will be affected.”102  The Sixth 
                                                          
93 Id. at 1313. 
94 Id.  However, one member of the majority wrote in concurrence that she would set aside an 
election if there had been an “egregious mistake of fact.”  Id. at 1314 (Murphy, Chair., 
concurring). 
95 General Knit of California, 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978). 
96 Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982). 
97 Id. at 129-30. 
98 Id. at 131.  The majority did make clear that the Board still would overturn election in 
instances “where a party has used forged documents which render the voters unable to recognize 
propaganda for what it is.” 
99 NLRB v. New Columbus Nursing Home, 720 F.2d 726 (1st Cir. 1983). 
100 Id. at 729. 
101 Id. (citation and quotations omitted).  In concurrence, Judge Bailey Aldrich wrote: “Midland 
seems to be burning down the barn to get rid of the rats; an abnegation of the Board's recognized 
duty to ensure a fair and free choice of bargaining.” 
102 Van Dorn Plastics Machinery Co. v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 343, 348 (6th Cir. 1984). 
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Circuit continues to apply this standard to misrepresentation cases.103  While 
other circuit courts have adopted the Midland standard,104 a number of circuit 
courts, including ones in circuits that have adopted it, have not yet decided 
whether to “fully support” the standard.105 
 3. Information Regulation and Disclosure.  Despite the finely-grained 
regulation of what cannot be said during the representation campaign, the 
Board has done little to require information disclosure from the parties.  There 
are no affirmative disclosure requirements on the part of employers or unions to 
provide certain kinds of information to employees.  In Florida Mining & 
Materials Corp., the Board rejected the employer's efforts to impose an 
"affirmative disclosure" requirement on the pre-election process.106  In that 
case, the union failed to reveal to the employees that the day before the 
election, it had been placed under temporary trusteeship by the international 
union.  The employer sought to overturn the election based on the union's 
failure to disclose.  The authority of the Board to impose such a rule was not 
questioned; however, the Board refused to do so based on its concerns about the 
administrative burden it would cause.  The Fifth Circuit found that the Board 
had not abused its discretion.107 
 The only instance of such required disclosure is not information that must 
be disclosed to employees, but rather information that the employer must 
disclose to the petitioning union.  In Excelsior Underwear, Inc.,108 the Board 
required employers to provide the union with the names and addresses of 
employees in the unit.109  This information is required within seven days of the 
approval of an election agreement; the union need not request it.110  The 
Excelsior requirement gives the union the ability to send materials and other 
                                                          
103 See NLRB v. St. Francis Healthcare Centre, 212 F.3d 945, 963-66 (6th Cir. May 19, 2000); 
NLRB v. Hub Plastics, Inc., 52 F.3d 608, 611-13 (6th Cir. May 08, 1995). 
104 C.J. Krehbiel Co. v. NLRB, 844 F.2d 880, 883-84 (D.C. Cir. 1988); State Bank of India v. 
NLRB, 808 F.2d 526, 538-39 (7th Cir. 1986); NLRB v. Semco Printing Ctr., Inc., 721 F.2d 886, 
892 (2d Cir. 1983); NLRB v. Monark Boat Co., 713 F.2d 355, 360 (8th Cir. 1983); NLRB v. 
Yellow Transp. Co., 709 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1983). 
105 Trencor Inc. v. NLRB, 110 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that it was “unnecessary to 
determine the full scope of this court’s support for the Midland doctrine”).  See also NLRB v. 
Dave Transportation Co., 1999 WL 196545, at *1 n.1 (9th Cir. April 1, 1999) (unpublished) 
(noting that they need not decide whether an exception to Midland is warranted); St. Margaret 
Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB, 991 F.2d 1146, 1158 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting in dicta that the Midland 
rule might not be sufficient in all cases); NLRB v. Affiliated Midwest Hospital, 789 F.2d 524, 
528 n.3 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that it need not reach the issue of whether the circuit should 
recognize an exception to Midland). 
106 Florida Mining & Materials Corp., 198 N.L.R.B. 601, enf'd 481 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1973). 
107 Id. 
108 Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966). 
109 Id. at 1239-40. 
110 Id.  
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communications to the employees at their home address.  Unions have taken 
advantage of the lists for this purpose.111 
 Although the Excelsior decision facilitates greater information disclosure, 
the Board and the courts have otherwise failed to pursue this goal.  There is no 
structured forum in which the union is given a chance to make its case to 
employees.  If the union wishes to speak with employees, it must do so off-site 
and outside of working hours.  An employer, by contrast, can require 
employees to attend a meeting in which it presents an anti-union case.  Such 
meetings, known as “captive audience speeches,” give employers a much better 
opportunity to make their case to employees.112 
 Union access to employees even in public places can be restricted by the 
employer.  In Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,113 the Supreme Court held that 
employers could prohibit all non-employee solicitation and distribution, 
including union solicitation, on its retail parking lot.  The Court ruled that the 
employer’s property rights trumped the union’s right to access unless the union 
could show that the employees could not be reached by other means.  The 
burden of proving such lack of access was a “heavy one,” as there was a 
presumption that the employees could be reached unless they actually lived on 
the employer’s property.114  A recent Board decision has extended Lechmere to 
                                                          
111  In their empirical study of thirty-one union representation elections, Getman, Goldberg and 
Herman found that employers sent written materials to employees in twenty-six of those 
elections, while union sent written materials in twenty-five.  JULIUS G. GETMAN ET AL., UNION 
REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY 90 (1976). In these elections, 92 percent of 
employees reported receiving employer material, while 85 percent reported receiving union 
material.  Id.  Addressing changes in communication technology, one commentator has proposed 
that unions be given private employee email addresses as part of the Excelsior disclosure.  G. 
Micah Wissinger, Informing Workers of the Right to Workplace Representation: Reasonably 
Moving from the Middle of the Highway to the Information Superhighway, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
331, 342-43 (2003). 
112 See Story, supra note AS1, at 415 (noting the “obvious point that allowing employers to hold 
such meetings, especially absent an opportunity for the union to do likewise, gives employers a 
strong advantage over unions”).    In their study of 31 union representation elections, Professors 
Getman, Goldberg, and Herman found that employers held captive-audience meetings in 28 of 
those elections, making such meetings more frequent than the distribution of written materials.  
GETMAN ET AL., supra note JG1, at 90-92.  Employee attendance at such meetings was high. Id.  
Although unions held off-site meetings in many of the 31 elections, a much smaller percentage of 
employees reported attending such meetings.  Id.  The authors note that those employees who did 
attend union meetings were much more likely to be union adherents.  Id. 
113 502 U.S. 527 (1992). 
114 Id. at 535, 540.  This Board and the courts have permitted union access on employer property 
for employees working at a remote lumber camp, NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167 
F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1948); in a company town, NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226 
(1949); and at a fish cannery, Chugach Alaska Fisheries, 295 N.L.R.B. 44 (1989).  
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allow a grocery store to prohibit nonemployee union organizers from using the 
snack bar in its store.115 
 Employers are allowed considerable leeway in restricting the flow of 
information between employees.  Although employees are able to solicit their 
fellow workers on the job, employers can restrict such solicitations to non-
working hours.116  Moreover, the employer may limit employees to oral 
solicitations in working areas.117  The employer can forbid the distribution of 
literature in working areas due to the threat of litter and disruption of 
productive order.118  Such a prohibition must apply to all such distributions, and 
it must be applied neutrally.119  An employer can also extend non-
discriminatory literature prohibitions to company bulletin boards120 and even 
computer screen savers.121  An employer also has the right to prohibit 
solicitations, including union solicitations, on its own internal e-mail, as long as 
it does so non-discriminatorily.122 
 Such lack of interest in getting information to employees is understandable 
under the political model, which allows the parties to generate all of the 
necessary information through their campaigns.  But it does not comport with 
the laboratory conditions model, where information would play a critical role in 
establishing the conditions for a fair and reasoned choice. 
 
C. Critiques of the Two Models 
 The two models of a scientific laboratory and a political election have 
found an uneasy coexistence in Board and court jurisprudence.  Commentators 
have criticized the dichotomy and generally have supported one model over the 
other – either implicitly or explicitly.  On one side, critics of the laboratory 
conditions model have argued that the exacting standard results in too much 
litigation over incidents that are unlikely to have any effect on the ultimate 
outcome.  On the other side, critics of the political election model note that the 
hands-off approach gives too much power and input to employers, who exploit 
their position to coerce the electorate.  
1. The Critique of the Laboratory Model: The Problem of Bureaucratic 
Obstruction 
                                                          
115 Farm Fresh, 326 N.L.R.B. 997 (1998).  For criticism of the Lechmere decision, see Cynthia L. 
Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty after Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REV. 305 (1994). 
116 Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945). 
117 Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615 (1962). 
118 Id. 
119 Marathon LeTourneau Co. v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1983).   
120 Honeywell, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 1402 (1982). 
121 St. Joseph’s Hospital, 337 N.L.R.B. 94 (2001). 
122 E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 919 (1993). 
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 Critics of the laboratory conditions model have argued that it is well-
intentioned but ultimately impossible to enforce.  In his standard-setting article 
on union representation campaigns, Derek Bok focused his attention on the 
“instability” and “[i]nconsistencies” of the Board’s laboratory conditions 
doctrine.123  Bok felt that the inconsistencies reflected “a deeper uncertainty 
regarding the nature of the election process itself.”124  He claimed that if the 
Board’s only guiding principle was to keep employee free from undue 
interference, the Board’s regulatory approach would continue to be incoherent 
and unstable.125  Instead, Bok argued that the Board should focus on a broader 
set of “legitimate interests” held by the parties involved.126 
 Bok agreed with the Board that there is a strong interest in protecting 
employees’ freedom of choice.127 He believed that in actuality, however, there 
was little role for law in making the union representation choice more rational.  
Bok arrived at this conclusion by breaking down an employee’s union 
representation decision into three questions: (1) Are conditions within the plant 
satisfactory?  (2) To what extent can the union improve on these conditions?  
(3) Will representation by the union bring countervailing disadvantages as a 
result of dues payments, strikes, or bitterness within the plant?128  While Bok 
noted that employees may be “best equipped” to answer the first question of the 
three, studies showed that employees misconceive the nature of their problems 
and may transfer concerns about other issues into an irrational focus on 
wages.129  As to the second question, Bok believed that the employee would be 
“hard pressed to decide to what extent a union can improve upon the 
situation.”130  He discussed how claims by the union about improvements at 
                                                          
123 Bok, supra note DB1, at 39. 
124 Id. at 40. 
125 Id. at 43, 45. 
126 Id. at 43. 
127 Bok described “freedom of choice” as follows. 
We may assume that one basic purpose of an election is to permit 
the voters to make as rational, and hence as accurate, a decision as 
they can concerning the issue before them.  In the context of a 
representation election, a rational decision implies that employees 
have access to relevant information, that they use this data to 
determine the possible consequences of selecting or rejecting the 
union, and that they appraise these possibilities in light of their own 
values and desires to determine whether a vote for the union 
promises to promote or impair their interests. 
Id. at 46. 
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129 Id. (citing BURLEIGH B. GARDNER & DAVID G. MOORE, HUMAN RELATIONS IN INDUSTRY (4th 
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other companies would be rebutted by the employer in ways that employees 
would be “in a poor position to resolve.”131  Regarding the third question, Bok 
argued that employees would be “particularly handicapped” in resolving this 
issue, as the answer depended on resolving a series of sub-issues for which 
there would often be “little evidence beyond partisan statements of employers 
and organizers and the anecdotal accounts of associates . . . .”132 
 Bok thus made clear that he believed informational difficulties stood in the 
way of employees making rational representation decisions.  As he noted, 
employees generally have little direct, personal information about the union, 
and there is little such information or analysis in the media and other 
independent sources.133  Given the lack of information on critical questions, 
Bok argued that employees were not making rational economic decisions by 
sifting the evidence.  Instead, they were basing their votes on irrelevant factors 
such as: the skillfulness of the union’s organizing strategy, the employer’s 
response to the organizing drive, the “likability” of both union and employer 
representatives, the opinions of certain “key employees” within the plant, 
community opinion of unions generally, and the background and past 
experiences of each employee.134  But ultimately, Bok concluded there was no 
rational economic calculus behind these elections.  If employees were not using 
the campaign to get important information about their choice, then the need to 
maintain its pristine intellectual conditions is less important as well. 
 Bok saw empirical support for his views in Union Representation 
Elections: Law and Reality by Julius Getman, Stephen Goldberg, and Jeanne 
Herman.135  The book essentially summarized a large-scale empirical 
investigation into the decisions made during a union representation election.  In 
a study remarkable for its breadth as well as for the administrative hurdles it 
overcame,136 the authors examined thirty-one union representation elections 
between 1972 and 1973.137  The authors orchestrated interviews of 1,239 
employees who participated in these elections.138  The interviews were 
conducted in two waves; first, as soon as possible after the NLRB directed an 
election to take place, and then again after the election.139  In the first wave, 
                                                          
131 Id. at 50. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 50. 
134 Id. at 51. 
135 See GETMAN ET AL., supra note JG1, at xi-xiii (foreword by Derek Bok). 
136 In order to get employees’ names and contact information for use in the study, the authors had 
to file a Freedom of Information Act claim against the Board.  Id. at 36-37.  The Board refused to 
provide the information until compelled by a federal court of appeals.  Id.; Getman v. NLRB, 450 
F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
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interviewers sought to assess the employee’s pre-campaign sentiments about 
union representation, their own working conditions, and how they intended to 
vote.140  In the second wave, employees were asked how and why they voted as 
well as what they remembered from the representation campaign.141  The 
authors then analyzed the results to determine what factors went into 
employees’ voting decisions, including the effects of employer and union 
campaign efforts. 
 The headline for the study is that the votes of 81 percent of the employees 
could be predicted from their pre-campaign attitudes about their job and about 
unions.142  The study also found that employees who had an intent to vote a 
particular way prior to the campaign generally ended up voting that way: 94 
percent of employees intending to vote for the company did so, as did 82 
percent of those intending to vote for the union.143  The authors were able to 
predict the outcome of 29 out of the 31 elections based on how employees 
intended to vote.144  They thus argue that these results disprove the Board’s 
assumption that free choice is fragile and employees will be significantly 
influenced by the campaign.145  This conclusion was supported by the study’s 
findings that employees remembered only a small percentage of issues from the 
campaign and, therefore, were “not generally attentive to the campaign.”146  
Interestingly, the authors state the following about employee “rationality” with 
regard to the campaign: 
 
The fact that employees do not pay close attention to the 
campaign does not mean that the voting decision is irrational.  
An employee who votes consistently with his pre-campaign 
attitudes is acting in a wholly rational manner.  His choice, to be 
sure, may not be reasoned in the sense in which the Board 
contemplates – based on a careful weighing of the campaign 
arguments put forth by each party – but that does not make it 
any less rational.147 
 
                                                          
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 62. 
143 Id. at 64. 
144 Id. 
145 However, the authors also admit that 19 percent of employees were initially undecided (six 
percent) or voted contrary to their original intent (13 percent), and that the votes of this 19 
percent were necessary for victory in nine out of the 31 elections.  Id. at 103.  Of these groups, 76 
percent of the switchers and 68 percent of the undecided voters ended up voting for the company.  
Id. at 111. 
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 The study also specifically examined the effects of unlawful employer 
campaigning on representation election results.  It found that employers had 
engaged in unlawful campaigning in 22 out of the 31 elections.148  In nine of 
those elections, the employer committed campaign violations serious enough to 
warrant a bargaining order.149  Despite this high level of misconduct, however, 
the study found generally no correlation between voting behavior and this 
illegal activity.  While noting that employees who signed union cards did in fact 
vote in significantly higher numbers against the union in elections marred by 
unlawful campaigning, the authors detected no such effects on employees who 
were undecided, employees who intended to vote for the union, or employees 
whose prior attitudes predicted a union vote.150  Even the firing of union 
supporters did not result in a significant change in voting behavior.151 
 Given these findings, Getman, Goldberg and Herman argue that the Board 
should drastically cut back on its regulation of representation elections.  
Campaign speech, according to the authors, “should be as free of governmental 
restrain as speech in political elections.”152  Grants of benefits should be 
allowed.153  Bargaining orders should be rare, as the election result, even if 
tainted, is likely to reflect the wishes of employees.154  However, the authors do 
moderate from this “hands-off” model in several instances.  They recommend 
harsher penalties, such as treble damages, for illegal discharges during the 
campaign.155  In addition, they argue in favor of equal opportunities for unions 
and employers to address the workers during work time on employer premises.  
Noting the employer’s significant advantage in communicating with 
employees, the authors argue that “an employer who holds campaign meetings 
on working time and premises should be required to allow the union (or unions) 
to hold such meetings on working time and premises.”156  Comparing the 
election again to the political process, the authors state: “It is fundamental to 
the democratic process that each party should have a roughly equal opportunity 
to communicate with the electorate, regardless of the effectiveness of that 
communication.”157 
 Getman, Goldberg, and Herman’s study was primarily criticized for its 
failure to blame employer coercion for the decreasing rate of private-employee 
                                                          
148 Id. at 111-13. 
149 Id. at 113. 
150 Id. at 115-16. 
151 Id. at 125-26. 
152 Id. at 150. 
153 Id. at 151. 
154 Id. at 153-56. 
155 Id. at 155-56.  This suggestion seems at odds with their earlier dismissal of the effects of such 
discharges. 
156 Id. at 157. 
157 Id.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
INFORMATION AND THE UNION REPRESENTATION MARKET           24 
 
 
unionization.158  As commentators pointed out, many of the statistics heralded 
by the authors as proof of campaign irrelevance could be read much more 
ambiguously.159  In fact, according to one reading of the study’s data, the study 
shows that unions would have won 46% to 47% of elections if they had been 
entirely free from illegal behavior, and 3% to 10% if the employers had 
campaigned at the highest level of illegality shown in the study.160  More 
generally, critics of the study have leveled the same attacks as they do against 
the political election model more generally: they claim its fails to account 
sufficiently for the insidious effects of employer coercion. 
2. The Critique of the Political Election Model: The Problem of Employer 
Coercion 
 In contrast to Bok, Getman, and others who discount the effects of the 
representation campaign, other commentators criticize federal labor policy for 
its failure to contain the campaign’s effects. In his article on reforming the 
representation election,161 Paul Weiler argued that the steady decline in union 
representation results in substantial part from a marked increase in employer 
coercion and illegal tactics directed at union campaigns and supporters.162  To 
prove this point, Weiler relied on statistics about two general trends.  First, 
Weiler noted that the rate of union victories in representation campaigns 
dropped from 74% in 1950 to 48% in 1980.163  At the same time, the number of 
unfair labor practice claims filed against employers rose from 4,472 claims in 
1950 to 31,281 claims in 1980, with the percentage of meritorious claims rising 
slightly.164  Putting these two trends together, Weiler argued that the decrease in 
union representation is correlated with the increase in employer unfair labor 
practices.  For further proof, Weiler compared the U.S. data with Canadian 
data.  Canada had roughly three times the rate of increasing union density from 
                                                          
158 See, e.g., Patricia Eames, An Analysis of the Union Voting Study from a Trade-Unionist’s 
Point of View, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1181, 1182 (1976); Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing 
Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1782 (1983). 
159 Eames, supra note PE1, at 1183-87; Weiler, supra note PW1, at 1782-86. 
160 Id. at 1786.  In making this assertion, Weiler relied on an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation by 
William Dickens.  See id. (citing William Dickens, Union Representation Elections: Campaign 
and Vote (1980)).  Dickens’ dissertation was published in edited form as William Dickens, The 
Effects of Company Campaigns on Certification Elections: Law and Reality Once Again, 36 
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 560 (1983).  Getman and Goldberg, along with a new co-author, 
responded to Weiler’s article as well as the Dickens’ analysis in Stephen B. Goldberg, Julius G. 
Getman & Jeanne M. Brett, The Relationship between Free Choice and Labor Board Doctrine: 
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new union certifications, as well as one-sixth the number of discriminatory 
discharge complaints per election.165 
 According to Weiler, weak remedies for unfair labor practices, combined 
with lengthy delays in the representation and remediation process, encouraged 
an atmosphere of employer coercion and lawbreaking.  In order to stem the tide 
of this illegal campaigning, Weiler argued not for greater penalties, but instead 
for the elimination of the campaign process itself.  Instead of a two-month 
campaign between initial filing and actual election, Weiler advocated for an 
“instant” (five days or less) election.166  Such a brief period would prevent 
employers from sustaining prolonged campaign offenses replete with unfair 
labor practices and other tactics of intimidation.167 
 Weiler acknowledged that the purpose of a union representation system is 
“to nurture and protect employee freedom of choice with respect to collective 
bargaining.”168  However, Weiler argued that the U.S. model overplays the 
significance of the union to employees by treating the union as “a quasi-
governmental authority over the employees.”169  By allowing the employer to 
participation in the campaign during a substantial period of time, the NLRA 
had in effect stated that “the employer is legitimately entitled to play the same 
role in a representation campaign against the union that the Republican Party 
plays in a political campaign against the Democrats.”170  As Weiler argued, this 
is strange – the union is seeking to represent employees in their relationship 
with the employer, in a context in which employees and employers often have 
adverse interests.171  A more apt analogy, according to Weiler, would be 
allowing foreign governments to have a role in our political campaigns.172  If 
anything, this is too weak; perhaps a better analogy would be allowing your 
spouse to have a say in who you hire as your divorce attorney. 
 Weiler did recognize “one final defense” for proponents of the current 
system: namely, the election campaign as “an aid to informed employee 
choice.”173  The employer serves as a proxy supporter for those employees who 
do not support the union and provides them with resources, arguments, and 
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organization.174  Weiler was not persuaded, however, based on his analysis of 
the costs and benefits to such a system.  He believed that the employer had a 
fair opportunity to make its case prior to the representation election; that U.S. 
workers were not unsophisticated about unions; and that employers would have 
a chance to make their case about working conditions during negotiations with 
the union.175  Weiler concluded: “The contribution made by the election 
campaign to the enlightenment of the employees is marginal at best.”176 
 Other commentators agree that the political model has “subverted labor’s 
right to representation.”177  Delving into Wagner Act legislative history as well 
as early Board decisions, Craig Becker developed how the democratic political 
campaign had become the “legitimating metaphor” for the Wagner Act and 
collective bargaining more generally.178  However, early Board decisions had 
not required a secret-ballot election in determining representation and, more 
importantly, had held that the employer had no role to play in the campaign 
process.179  It was not until the Supreme Court and the Taft-Hartley Act 
intervened that the Board was required to have secret-ballot elections and to 
allow the employer the right to present its case.180 
 Once the electoral model was imposed on the representation campaign, the 
Board’s regulation of the process vacillated between a laissez-faire political 
model and the much stricter laboratory conditions model.181  The laboratory 
conditions model is thus seen as a response to the employer’s new role: in order 
to restrain the effects of employer participation, the Board needed to lay down 
strict requirements on electioneering.  Commentators have criticized Board 
regulations based on the dissonance between these concepts.182  But as Becker 
pointed out, the political analogy itself is inapt.  Employers are not competing 
against unions in a neutral election, but rather are attempting to influence an 
election in an arena where they hold ultimate power.183  The answer, according 
to Becker, is not to embrace the freewheeling regulation of the political model 
but rather to get rid of the political analogy and its trappings.184  Becker’s 
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prescription is to strip employers of “any legally cognizable interest in their 
employees’ election of representatives.”185 
 What exactly would this mean?  Becker did not propose that employers 
must remain neutral during representation campaigns.  Instead, he argued that 
employers should not have any official role in the election process.  Thus, 
employers would have no grounds to contest the unit or otherwise participate in 
representation hearings.186  Employers would not have the right to challenge 
elections or voters, and thus would not have the right to place observers at the 
polls.187  More generally, campaign rules would attempt to prevent employers 
from “exploiting their singular economic power to persuade employees.”188  
Thus, employers would not be permitted to host any “captive audience” 
campaign presentations.189  They would be bound to follow the rules on 
solicitation and distribution that they laid down for union representatives.190  
Although Becker’s proposal thus seems to allow for employer speech as long as 
similar opportunities are offered to the union, he did state that “[i]t is but a short 
step to the realization that all employer speech to employees during working 
hours, at the workplace, is speech to a captive audience.”191 
 Becker’s rhetoric is firmly set against any participation by the employer in 
representation campaigns.  But his proposed solution allows employers to 
continue to have a role in the election process, albeit a non-legally-sanctioned 
one.  Like the critics of the laboratory conditions model, he is not willing to 
commit to the logical extension that his ideas would require.  The reason, 
perhaps, is that both sets of critics are missing the critical role that campaigns 
and employers play, albeit imperfectly, in providing information to employees 
about their representation decision. 
 
 
PART II: THE UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTION AS A PURCHASE OF SERVICES 
 
 In considering the regulation of the union representation election, the 
Board, courts, and commentators have vacillated between the paradigms of 
scientific laboratory and political election.  These wildly disparate frameworks 
have led to incoherence in representation campaign regulation.  Moreover, 
these frameworks represent a deep disagreement over the nature of the election 
itself.  Proponents of the political model believe that the NLRB has swamped a 
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balanced and democratic process with a flood of complicated regulations.  
Believing that most employees have already made up their minds, they argue 
for a hands-off approach to the campaign.  Their reforms focus on cutting down 
red tape in order to secure election results more quickly and enable participants 
to settle in to the post-election reality.  Proponents of the laboratory-conditions 
approach argue that employer coercion and disapproval are what swamp 
employees during the election campaign.  For them, participation in 
representation campaigns allows employers to cow their employees through 
legal and illegal means.  Although some acknowledge a role for the 
representation campaign, they generally believe that employers’ roles in those 
campaigns should be greatly reduced or even eliminated. 
 There is a simpler and more elegant paradigm to apply.  The union 
representation election is, at root, a decision to purchase group representation 
services.  Employees are agreeing to pay the union in return for the services that 
the union provides.  Because of the nature of the services, the decision cannot 
be made individually.  Thus, the election is used to determine whether most 
employees desire to purchase these services. 
 This seemingly straightforward concept has not taken root in the 
jurisprudence or the literature surrounding the representation election.  
However, it provides the best paradigm for the election and it concomitant 
campaign, and pieces of it have shone though in some discussions in the past.  
This part further develops why the “purchase of services” paradigm is most 
applicable. 
 
A. The Services 
 Employees choose unions because of the services they provide.  The 
services offered relate to representation of a group of employees in their 
negotiations with an employer.  The union is the sole representative of the 
employees in bargaining over terms and conditions of employment.192  It 
manages the strategy of negotiations, strikes, lockouts, and other weapons of 
“economic warfare.”193  Once a contract has been negotiated, the union 
administers the agreement and, if the agreement includes arbitration, represents 
individual employees in grievances against the employer.  By electing the union 
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as their representative, employees have essentially designated the union as their 
representative in exchange for the payment of dues. 
 The most analogous service would be representation of individual 
employees in their negotiations with an employer – a sports or entertainment 
agent, for example.  However, representation by a union has several important 
differences.  First, an agent represents employees on an individualized basis.  
The union represents a collection of employees – all of the employees within a 
designated bargaining unit.  Second, employees who vote against the union 
must still pay for the representation services they provide (except in right-to-
work states).194  Individual employees, on the other hand, have individualized 
agreements and thus have sole control over the decision.  Third, the NLRA 
gives the union certain statutory rights as the employee’s collective bargaining 
representative.  The employer must, for example, bargain with the union over 
any changes to mandatory terms and conditions of employment.195  Individual 
agents, on the other hand, generally work within the common-law contractual 
framework and have no special rights, outside those negotiated between the 
employer and the employee or, in some cases, the employer and a union. 
 Despite these differences, the purpose of unions and individual agents 
remains much the same – to secure better terms and conditions of employment 
for their workers.  Thus, an economically rational decision to vote for or against 
a union would be based on whether the employee expects that the union will, in 
fact, improve terms and conditions.196  Legal commentators have recognized 
this conclusion, even as they fail to apply its ramifications.  For example, Derek 
Bok wrote that the union representation decision rests on into three questions: 
(1) Are conditions within the plant satisfactory?  (2) To what extent can the 
union improve on these conditions?  (3) Will representation by the union bring 
countervailing disadvantages as a result of dues payments, strikes, or bitterness 
within the plant?197  These questions simply break down the overall utility 
                                                          
194 NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 744-45 (1963) (permitting “agency shop” 
agreements whereby unions charge non-members for the costs of collective representation).  But 
see National Labor Relations Act § 14(b), 29 U.S.C. § 164 (2006) (permitting states to outlaw 
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question.  On the other side, Paul Weiler agrees that employees will make a 
judgment about the value that the union brings to the table.  However, he 
believes that the best time for employees to make that judgment is during 
contract negotiations, after the union has already been chosen.198 
 Instead of being trumpeted or refuted, the purchase-of-services paradigm 
has instead been largely ignored.  The laboratory conditions model focuses on 
the “uninhibited desires” of employees, either for or against unionization,199 but 
treats this desire as an essence to be distilled.  It is hard to say what this essence 
would be, other than a desire to secure the union’s representation services.  The 
political election paradigm treats the decision as a choice between the employer 
and the union as to who will govern in the workplace.  But the employer retains 
ultimate power over the workplace in any event; if the union wins, it simply 
secures certain representational rights.200  Thus, the political election paradigm 
misrepresents the true nature of the choice. 
 Perhaps the best counterargument to the purchase-of-services paradigm is 
the notion that the union is merely a collection of employees who joined 
together to exercise their communal rights in bargaining with the employer.  
But this model represents only the smallest fraction of union representation 
under the Act.  Although occasionally a group of employees will form a “labor 
organization” amongst themselves, the overwhelming majority of unions are 
outside organizations that seek to represent employees at a variety of different 
employers.  Unions are independent institutions with their own set of internal 
procedures, leadership, and employees.  They generally have complete 
discretion in handling negotiations with employers.  A union may even execute 
a collective bargaining agreement without any approval by the represented 
employees.201  The union is the employees’ representative; it is not a 
representation of them. 
 In fact, the appeal of unions is that they have the ability to get more for 
employees than the employees would get on their own.  Part of this may stem 
from a union’s ability to represent a large group  
                                                          
198 Weiler, supra note PW1, at 1811 (“Rather than decide on the basis of easily made promises in 
a representation campaign that takes place months before serious negotiations begin, the 
employees can see what their employer actually offers at the bargaining table, compare these 
offers with what their union demands, and then make up their minds whether to take the risks and 
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of employees across companies and thus control the labor supply in a particular 
region and industry.  Also important, however, is the union’s ability to 
represent all of the employees in a particular group at a particular employer 
with one (solitary) voice.202  The union’s prowess in conducting the 
negotiations, including its knowledge of the law and its ability to be informed 
about the industry practices, also contributes value to the employees.  These 
services are what lead to the resulting better terms and conditions that 
successful unions secure for their employees. 
 Finally, the notion that union members are only paying “dues” may also 
contribute to the idea of union as a voluntary association of workers pursuing 
mutual gain.  But dues are simply individual payments for the costs of the 
services that are being provided.  Employees represented by a union are not 
forced to join the union if they do not wish to.  But all covered employees must 
pay for the costs of the services that the union provides.203  Congress permitted 
a union to charge nonmembers on the theory that nonmembers would be 
essentially free riding on the union’s services if payments were not made.204  In 
the Beck decision, the Supreme Court chose to differentiate between different 
components of the dues, and ruled that non-members need not pay the union for 
services that are not directly related to collective bargaining services.205 This 
somewhat cabined view of union representation helps makes the point that 
represented employees are paying for a service – that of union representation.206 
  
B. The Providers 
 Another factor in our conceptualization of the employee-union relationship 
is the nature of the union itself.  The NLRA has a fairly broad definition of a 
“labor organization”: it is “any organization of any kind, or any agency or 
                                                          
202 As one economist has noted: “The strike is by far the most important source of union power, 
and the union is now virtually the sole organizer of strikes.”  ALBERT REES, THE ECONOMICS OF 
TRADE UNIONS 31 (1962).   
203 NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 744-45 (1963) (permitting “agency shop” 
agreements whereby unions charge non-members for the costs of collective representation). 
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206 Of course, one might also argue that businesses in service industries are permitted to use their 
funds for lobbying and political activity, even if individual purchasers of those services may not 
wish to subsidize such activity.  Thus, the “purchase-of-services” model might counsel against 
the Court’s holding in Beck. 
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employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and 
which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers 
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of 
employment, or conditions of work.”207  Theoretically, under the NLRA a labor 
union could take a variety of forms: for-profit corporation, nonprofit 
corporation, partnership, LLC, voluntary association, or even sole 
proprietorship.  However, unions representing employees under the NLRA are 
almost always nonprofit associations. 
 There seem to be three functional reasons for this phenomenon.  First, the 
Clayton Act provides antitrust exemption for those labor organizations 
“instituted for the purposed of mutual help, and not having capital stock or 
conducted for profit.”208  This exemption thus excludes for-profit unions.  
Second, nonprofit status affords tax benefits.209  Third, the requirements of the 
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act would be difficult to meet 
for organizations other than nonprofit associations.  Under the LMRDA, unions 
must give their members “equal rights and privileges within such organization 
to nominate candidates, to vote in elections or referendums of the labor 
organization, to attend membership meetings, and to participate in the 
deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings.”210  Dues can only 
be increased through a vote by the majority of the membership.211  Unions must 
file extensive reports with the Department of Labor regarding assets, liabilities, 
salaries, and other proprietary information.212  In addition, the LMRDA 
imposes strict fiduciary duty requirements on union officers and employees.213  
It would be difficult to construct a for-profit organization that could meet these 
regulatory requirements.  And the definition of labor organization under the 
LMRDA is also fairly broad, meaning that almost all unions representing 
employees under the NLRA must meet the LMRDA’s requirements.214 
                                                          
207 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2000).  The Board will also disqualify a union from acting as a labor 
organization if it suffers from a conflict of interest.  See, e.g., St. John’s Hosp. & Health Ctr., 264 
N.L.R.B. 990 (1982) (disqualifying a union that provided ancillary employment referral 
services); Sierra Vista Hosp., 241 N.L.R.B. 631 (1979) (disqualifying a union for including 
supervisors in policy-making positions). 
208 Clayton Act, § 6, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 17). 
209 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(5) (2000). 
210 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (2000). 
211 Id. at § 411(a)(3). 
212 Id. at § 431. 
213 Id. at § 501 (requiring, inter alia, that union agents “to hold [the union’s] money and property 
solely for the benefit of the organization and its members and to manage, invest, and expend the 
same in accordance with its constitution and bylaws and any resolutions of the governing bodies 
adopted thereunder”). 
214 Id. at 402(i), (j). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INFORMATION AND THE UNION REPRESENTATION MARKET           33 
 
 
 Because of their organizational form, unions may not be conceptualized as 
players in the commercial realm.  But they provide representation services in 
return for payment.  In this regard, they are similar to other nonprofit 
organizations that provide services for a market price: so-called “commercial” 
nonprofits.215  Like many hospitals, day care centers, and nursing homes, 
unions are “nonprofits that receive no significant amount of donations, but 
derive their income almost exclusively from prices charged for private goods 
and service they deliver to paying customers.”216  The rationales provided for 
the nonprofit form in the commercial context generally relate to the nature of 
the product and customers.  As Henry Hansmann has argued, “nonprofit firms 
commonly arise where customers are in a peculiarly poor position to determine, 
with reasonable cost and effort, the quality or the quantity of the services they 
receive from a firm.”217  As will be discussed below, employees are in a 
particularly poor position to judge the quality of union representation services 
prior to securing those services.218  Moreover, like colleges and nursing homes, 
unions generally provide services in which the customer becomes “locked in” 
for a period of time.219 
 It may seem strange that the members of the union are also its customers.  
But this organizational form is not unique.  Customer-owned enterprises are 
common in many industries.220  In addition, unions bear a close resemblance – 
in their organizational form – to for-profit public corporations.221  Stockholders 
in a public company can be likened to members, in that they vote for the 
leadership that manages the organization from day to day.  Both members and 
stockholders are the “citizens” of the polity that can vote in or vote out those 
who run the organization.  At the same time, stockholders are also likened to 
customers for purposes of the securities laws; they are provided with a vast 
array of consumer protections, such as mandatory disclosure and antifraud 
causes of action.222  The notion that stockholders control the organization but 
also look to the organization for financial rewards finds common ground with 
the perspective of union members. 
                                                          
215 HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 234 (1996). 
216 Id.  
217 Id. at 228. 
218 See Part III.A infra. 
219 See Part III.E infra (discussing the difficulty of the union decertification process); HANSMANN, 
supra note HH1, at 234 (noting customer lock-in as a reason for preferring a nonprofit service 
provider). 
220 See id. at 149-223 (discussing customer-owned cooperatives in the areas of wholesale and 
supply firms, utilities, clubs, and housing cooperatives). 
221 Stewart J. Schwab, Union Raids, Union Democracy, and the Market for Union Control, 1992 
U. ILL. L. REV. 367, 374-76. 
222 See Securities Act of 1933; Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (as amended). 
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 Without the antitrust, tax, and LMRDA provisions which make the 
nonprofit form a necessity, unions might find that a for-profit organizational 
form would better serve their organizational needs.223  However, even as 
nonprofits, unions fit comfortably within the collection of commercial 
nonprofits that provide services to paying customers and may even make a 
profit.224   
 
C. The Decision to Purchase 
 The “purchase of services” paradigm may also encounter difficulty in 
considering the method of the purchase.  Unlike an individual consumer 
decision, employees can only purchase union representation services by a 
majority vote.  If a majority of employees vote in favor of union representation, 
all employees receive those services and must pay the cost of those services.  If 
a majority of employees vote against union representation, than none of the 
employees can enjoy the benefits of that representation.  Since most consumer 
transactions can be made individually and voluntarily, the notion of workers 
being compelled to pay for services they do not want cuts against the notion of 
employees as consumers.  Moreover, the notion that the decision is made by an 
election is also anathema to the usual purchase of services.  Elections are 
decisions about institutional leadership; purchases are decisions about personal 
needs and preferences. 
 The odd structure of the purchasing decision, however, can be accounted 
for by the nature of the service being purchased.  The services are not 
individualized services, but rather are provided to the group.  Payment by all 
those who enjoy the services is necessary in order to prevent free-riding.  But 
that necessitates that some employees may be forced to pay for services they do 
not want.  Of course, that occurs every day in consumer transactions: service 
providers may not provide the exact services that individual consumers want, 
and consumers may end up paying for services they would choose not to 
take.225  Other service providers, such as neighborhood associations, also 
                                                          
223 See Samuel Estreicher, Deregulating Union Democracy, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 501, 516-
17 (arguing that the Clayton Act and the LMRDA should be amended to allow for-profit unions).  
Henry Hansmann argues more generally that many commercial nonprofits may also be efficiently 
reorganized as for-profits.  HANSMANN, supra note HH1, at 234-35 (arguing that nonprofits offer 
a “crude form of consumer protection” that may not be sufficient to justify the other 
inefficiencies of the nonprofit organizational form). 
224 Nonprofits are only constrained from distributing their profits to persons who exercise control 
over the firm.  This constraint may explain the types of corruption demonstrated by certain union 
leadership.  See Estreicher, supra note SE1, at 512-13 (noting that union leaders may plow profits 
into excessive amenities, office buildings, perks, and salaries). 
225 For example, cable television purchasers can only buy certain packages with a pre-set 
selection of television channels.  As a result, they may end up paying for channels they would 
otherwise choose not to take.  In addition, home purchasers may often have to pay dues to 
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impose mandatory fees on those who receive services, even if individual 
customers would choose to reject those services.  The key elements are that: (a) 
the services can only be provided to a group, and (b) there needs to be some 
mechanism for allowing the group to choose those services, even if some group 
members might disagree. 
 An election is one possible mechanism for making that choice.  However, 
on its face, the consumer model would seem to favor a system of card-check 
certification.  If a majority of employees choose to have union representation, 
there should be no need for an election: the majority has already expressed its 
will.  The election, however, is designed to protect employees against coercion, 
specifically union coercion, and is also designed to provide information to 
employees about their decision. 
 Since the generation of information is a key justification for the 
representation election, it is surprising that the Board, courts, and commentators 
have generally overlooked its importance.  Indeed, there are reasons to believe 
that the union representation decision is particularly in need of oversight with 
respect to the information that employees have in making their decision.  The 
information problems in the market for union representation raise particular 
concerns about the economic rationality and efficiency of those decisions. 
 
 
PART III:  INFORMATION DEFICIENCIES IN THE MARKET FOR UNION 
REPRESENTATION 
 
 Rational decisions to exchange goods or services – in other words, trade – 
are the key mechanisms to improving our individual and societal welfare.226  
Contracts are the legal mechanism for enforcing trades in our economic system.  
According to economic theory, contracts should be enforced because of their 
Pareto optimality: they increase the utility of all of the parties to the 
exchange.227  Of course, there can be contractual winners and losers; many 
                                                                                                                                             
nonprofit neighborhood associations, whether they would independently choose to or not.  See 
Sarah Max, Hate Your Homeowners Association?, CNN Money, April 22, 2004, at: 
http://money.cnn.com/2004/03/09/pf/yourhome/homeownersassociation/index.htm 
(“Homeowners are obligated to pay [association] dues – which can be anything from $100 to 
$10,000 a year, depending on the neighborhood and its amenities.”). 
226 The stereotypical beginning to every microeconomics course is the discussion of utility 
involving two people each with a large supply of one good.  One may have peanut butter, for 
example, and the other grape jam.  The professor demonstrates how each party will be better off 
if they trade some of their good for some of the other party’s good.  For example, if Jack has ten 
jars of peanut butter and trades three of his jars for three jars of Jane’s jam, both Jack and Jane 
will be better off. 
227 See Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability 
Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 
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contracts are about hedging risk, and one party may end up regretting the 
decision to contract after the fact.  But when the contract is created, both parties 
agree to it (per economic doctrine) because they believe it increases their net 
present utility. 
 However, for contractual exchanges to be Pareto optimal, they must use the 
proper data, or “perfect information.”228  If the data is faulty, the results will be 
faulty, no matter how logical the decisionmaker.229  To what extent do we 
simply trust parties to gather information for themselves?  The common law of 
contract has long struggled with how to manage information in the bargaining 
process.  From the beginning courts have prohibited fraud – i.e., 
misrepresentations about information material to the contract.  However, the 
definition of “fraud” has long extended to omissions in disclosure as well as 
affirmative misrepresentations, as the famous case of Laidlaw v. Organ230 
attests.  Many scholars have attempted to provide a theoretical basis for 
determining when parties to a contract negotiation have a duty to disclose 
material information.231  Although one might say that, in the absence of a 
fiduciary relationship, there is no common law requirement to disclose, this is 
an overstatement.232  In fact, in a number of instances, courts have required 
parties to disclose information, or they will risk rescission or even liability for 
fraud.233 
                                                                                                                                             
283, 284 (1995) ("In the area of contract law, the efficiency argument concludes that courts 
should enforce all voluntary contracts that do not produce negative externalities, regardless of 
their distributive consequences. If a contract is voluntary, then it presumptively improves the 
well-being of both parties."). 
228 See DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 87 
(1994) (defining perfect information as “all relevant information about the market including the 
price and quality of the product”); Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost 
Consumer Credit: The Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REV. 807, 881 
(2003) (“Without accurate information about the quality and especially the price of any good, no 
person can minimize their opportunity costs, since they cannot compare the value of that product 
to their next best option. Thus, in a policymaking system of private decisionmaking, where 
individuals act without accurate cost information, there is no policymaking at all, rather just the 
random and often tragic outcomes of market anarchy.”). 
229 Or, as the saying goes, “garbage in, garbage out.”  See Webopedia, garbage in, garbage out, 
available at: http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/g/garbage_in_garbage_out.html. 
230 15 U.S. 178 (1817).  At issue in Laidlaw was a contract for the sale of tobacco made at the 
close of the War of 1812.  The buyer knew that the war had ended and, with that, the British 
blockade that had reduced the value of tobacco.  The Supreme Court ruled that while there was 
no requirement for the buyer to disclose the information, he had a duty not to “impose upon” the 
buyer if the failure to answer the question was misleading.  Id. at 194.   
231 Kimberly D. Krawiec & Kathryn Zeiler, Common Law Disclosure Duties and the Sin of 
Omission: Testing the Meta-theories 91 VA. L. REV. 1795, 1796 (2005) (noting that “[d]ozens of 
law reviews” have dealt with this “hotly debated question[]”). 
232 Id. 
233 See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (SECOND) § 161 (listing four general exceptions). 
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 To a large extent, however, the common law of contractual disclosure has 
been superseded by a variety of statutory schemes that endeavor to regulate 
information in the context of particular markets.  A variety of consumer 
protection laws focus in part on providing information about critical aspects of 
the product.234  The Food & Drug Administration requires extensive labeling on 
prepackaged food products in order to inform the public about ingredients, 
calories, and fat content.235  The Truth in Lending Act requires the disclosure of 
interest rates in understandable terms. 236  Perhaps most famously, the 
Securities Act of 1933237 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934238 instituted 
a sweeping program of regulation based primarily on required disclosure.  
These statutes are designed to empower the consumer to make efficient 
decisions by having the proper information.239 
 Surprisingly, however, concerns about consumer information have not been 
raised about the choice for union representation.  One might think that the 
presence of relevant information would be critical under the laboratory 
conditions model.  But the model has been used primarily to keep problematic 
information out, rather than making sure the proper information gets in.  The 
political election model assumes that the two “parties” will generate the 
information between themselves that is sufficient for the employees to make 
their decision. 
                                                          
234 For example, the federal Moss-Magnuson Warranty Act requires disclosure about warranties 
on consumer products.  See Joan Vogel, Squeezing Consumers: Lemon Laws, Consumer 
Warranties, and a Proposal for Reform, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 589, 610 (“The basic goal of the 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act is to improve the warranty information available to consumers by 
providing for full disclosure of all written warranty terms in a clear and concise manner.”). 
235 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 371(a), 393(b)(2)(A) (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 101.9 (2006); U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, What FDA Regulates, available at: http://www.fda.gov/comments/regs.html.    
For discussion of a particular change in the regulations, see Food & Drug Admin., Food 
Labeling: Trans Fatty Acids in Nutrition Labeling, Nutrient Content Claims, and Health Claims, 
68 Fed. Reg. 41434 (July 11, 2003). 
236 Peterson, supra note CP1, at 880 (“The most important requirements of the Truth in Lending 
provisions centered around the disclosure of the cost of credit based on standard uniform 
requirements set out by the act and by the Federal Reserve Board.”).  See also Matthew A. 
Edwards, Empirical and Behavioral Critiques of Mandatory Disclosure: Socio-Economics and 
the Quest for Truth in Lending, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 199, 212-16 (2005) (discussing 
TILA policies). 
237 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a – 77aa (2000). 
238 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a – 78mm (2000). 
239 See, e.g., Peterson, supra note CP1, at 883 (“Unlike interest rate caps and other control 
devices, disclosure regulation – at least in theory – increases the freedom of consumers through 
giving the opportunity to open one's own eyes. With a uniform method of learning the costs and 
characteristics of credit contracts, debtors can determine which credit contracts are in their best 
interests.”). 
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 Yet there are strong reasons to believe that consumers do not get the 
appropriate information about the pros and cons of union representation in the 
context of the campaign.  These reasons are discussed more fully below. 
 
A.  Information Asymmetry. 
 As noted above, the basic common law contractual paradigm assumes that 
parties to a contract will obtain their own information.  Although the common 
law prohibits fraud and requires truthful disclosure in response to questioning, 
there is no general duty to disclose information.  In limited circumstances, such 
as the sale of a home, courts require disclosure of known defects.240  For the 
most part, however, requiring disclosure of information more generally is seen 
as dampening the incentive to find this information in the first place.241 
 Moreover, in most cases the market will provide incentives for participants 
to disclose information voluntarily.  Consumers will not buy a product unless 
they know something about it.  If a seller fails to disclose sufficient 
information, consumers will demand the information; those sellers that provide 
it will sell more products.242  Sellers have an incentive to provide enough 
information so that buyers can identify their product and judge for themselves 
whether they want the product and at what cost.243 
 Of course, it may be possible for a market to fail to provide such 
information on its own.  For reasons discussed further below, market 
participants may have incentives to reveal insufficient information about the 
product, leading eventually to market failure.  One of the most famous 
examples of such a situation is the market for used cars as modeled by George 
Akerlof.244  As described by Akerlof, the sellers of used cars have much more 
information about the true quality of the car than do sellers.  Moreover, it is 
difficult to correct this information asymmetry, given the inability of most 
buyers to determine quality or to trust a seller’s purported information 
                                                          
240 See, e.g., Hill v. Jones, 725 P.2d 1115, 1119 (Ariz. 1986) (requiring the seller to disclose 
material facts about a home when such facts are not readily observable and not known to the 
buyer (citing Johnson v. Davis, 480 So.2d 625, 629 (Fla. 1985)). 
241 RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 111 (6th ed. 2003). 
242 We may need information to get us interested in contracting in the first place.  Of course, 
advertising is to some extent hype and persuasion, but it is also information.  See, e.g., CARLTON 
& PERLOFF, supra note CP1, at 602-04 (discussing the difference between informational 
advertising and persuasive advertising). 
243 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection 
of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 681, 714 (1984) (noting that information is generally left to the 
market “because of a conclusion that people who make or use a product (or test it as Consumers' 
Union does) will obtain enough of the gains from information to make the markets reasonably 
efficient”). 
244 George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
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disclosure.  Under Akerlof’s model, buyers will be forced to assume that a used 
car is a “lemon” and thus will only offer to pay the value of a lemon, regardless 
of the car’s actual quality.  Those with quality used cars will thus elect to keep 
their cars rather than sell them at a drastically reduced value, leaving only those 
with actual lemons in the market.  Akerlof thus predicts that a downward spiral 
may result, in which “it is quite possible to have the bad driving out the not-so-
bad driving out the medium driving out the no-so-good driving out the good in 
such a sequence of events that no market exists at all.”245 
 The “market for lemons” problem is not confined to used cars.  As Bernard 
Black has pointed out, securities markets are a “vivid example” of Akerlof’s 
market for lemons; “[i]ndeed, they are a far more vivid example than [the] 
original example of used cars.”246  Black explains: 
 
Used car buyers can observe the car, take a test drive, have a 
mechanic inspect the car, and ask others about their experiences 
with the same car model or manufacturer.  By comparison, a 
company’s shares, when the company first goes public, are like 
an unobservable car, produced by an unknown manufacturer, on 
which investors can obtain only dry, written information that 
they can’t directly verify.247 
 
If investors cannot verify the information they receive about a security, the 
market is ripe for exploitation.  Knowing this, investors will treat every security 
as if they cannot trust the underlying facts about it.  This underpricing will 
drive the higher quality issuers out of the market, leading to Akerlof’s 
downward spiral which completely destroys the market. 
 Why is information so crucial to the securities markets?  A security, 
particularly corporate shares, represents a property right in something that 
exists only as a fictional person, created through documents filed in a particular 
state.  Shareholders generally do not run the business; they contribute capital so 
that others may run a profitable business and pay the shareholders the residual.  
A shareholder trusts the people who run the corporation – officers and directors 
– to act as their representatives in running the corporation so as to maximize 
shareholder value.248  Although shareholders elect the board of directors, who 
                                                          
245 Id. at 490. 
246 Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 
UCLA L. REV. 781, 786 (2001). 
247 Id. 
248 Directors are not strictly agents of the corporation; they are in fact more akin to elected 
representatives.  See, e.g., Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co., Ltd. v. Cunninghame, 
2 Ch. 34 (Eng. C.A. 1906) (establishing the right of directors to act contrary to the wishes of a 
majority of shareholders as expressed through a resolution); Continental Securities Co. v. 
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in turn appoint the officers who run the corporation, this power is very difficult 
to exercise in a large corporation.  Thus, shareholders must be able to trust 
directors and officers to use their money appropriately.  There is a very real 
“agency costs” concern that lies at the heart of much corporate law today.249 
 Are unions subject to the “market for lemons” problem?  Upon 
examination, they are subject to agency cost concerns similar to those of 
corporate shareholders.  Union members trust that their union dues will be used 
by union officials to get them the best terms and conditions of employment 
possible.  And similar to shareholders, union members have the right to elect 
these officials, although that power is similarly attenuated, especially at the 
national level.250   
 Union representation services also have the more general information 
asymmetries that contribute to a “market for lemons.”  Unions provide services 
that are not transparent; they are not easy to judge before purchase.251  The 
union promises to improve the employees’ terms and conditions of 
employment.  How much better will the terms and conditions be?  Will the 
negotiations proceed easily, or must a painful strike be endured?  How effective 
will the union be in representing employees in grievance arbitrations?  Are 
union officials paid the appropriate amount, or are they overpaid?  Would they 
properly manage my retirement?  It is very difficult to know ahead of time what 
the union dues will buy.252  Even after purchase, it may be difficult to know the 
                                                                                                                                             
Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 16 (1912) (“[T]he directors are not ordinary agents . . . .  [T]hey are 
trustees with the power of controlling the property . . . without hindrance.”). 
249 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
250 Stewart J. Schwab, Union Raids, Union Democracy, and the Market for Union Control, 1992 
U. ILL. L. REV. 367, 367-68. 
251 Id. at 379-80.  Products with unobservable qualities are sometimes described as “experience 
goods”  – namely, goods whose “salient characteristics can only be learned after purchase, by 
actual use.”  See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of 
Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 659 (1979).  
Experience goods are contrasted with “search goods,” for which the consumer can establish the 
product’s quality prior to purchase.  See, e.g., CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note CP1, at 600-01.  
Although Schwartz and Wilde generally argue that policymakers have overstated information 
problems, they concede that their use of search equilibrium models sheds “relatively little light” 
on the question of information with respect to experience goods.  Schwartz & Wilde, supra, at 
662. 
252 The problem applies even after employees have joined the union.  See Schwab, supra note 
SS1, at 379-80 (“Union members have even greater difficulty monitoring and evaluating their 
leaders. Was the last wage increase a good one? Did the leaders work hard at the bargaining 
table, or did they shirk?  Could tougher negotiations have produced more? Are the union leaders 
becoming too cozy -- or too confrontational -- with management? Is the low return from the 
pension fund due to improper investments or bad market conditions? Are leaders earning their 
salaries? In short, could leaders be doing better?”). 
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quality of the union’s negotiating abilities.253 In addition, union services cannot 
be trial-tested before purchasing them.  It takes a very costly and time 
consuming process and agreement by a majority of employees to purchase 
union representation services.  And as will be discussed below,254 once those 
services have been purchased, it is very difficult to get out of them.  In voting 
for union representation, employees must make a leap of faith: that the money 
they pay to the union will be used to better their terms and conditions of 
employment, rather than leaving them the same or even making them worse.  
Like the decision to buy a stock, the purchaser needs information about the 
organization in order to determine whether the benefits of such a decision 
outweigh the costs. 
 But even if employees cannot easily get the necessary information by 
looking at the product or from past experience, won’t union and employers 
provide the necessary information themselves?  As discussed next, there are 
reasons to believe that the information will not be properly conveyed. 
 
B. Inverse Employer Incentives 
 The market for union representation services is constructed as an election.  
Employees obtain representation services by voting for such services through a 
secret ballot election.  As noted earlier,255 the pre-election process is often 
analogized to a political campaign in which the union and the employer are 
running against each other.  In a traditional political campaign, the parties to the 
election are expected to generate all the necessary information for voters to 
make their decision.  Each candidate has an incentive to point out his or her 
positive features, as well as his or her opponent’s negative features.  Given 
these incentives, the voters can expect to get all positive and negative 
information about the candidates from the candidates’ pre-election 
campaigns.256 
                                                          
253 Goods whose relative quality cannot be determined even after purchase are sometimes 
referred to as “credence goods.”  Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the 
Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67, 68-69 (1973).    
254 See infra Part III.E. 
255 See supra Part I.B. 
256 Thus, much of the debate surrounding campaign reform has been whether parties have 
sufficient funds to get their message out.  Those in favor of campaign finance reforms generally 
believe that a combination of federal campaign funding and limitations on private donations are 
necessary to enable a level informational playing field. See, e.g., Dennis F. Thompson, Two 
Concepts of Corruption: Making Campaigns Safe for Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1036, 
1047 (2005) (“[E]lectoral corruption in a campaign occurs insofar as private power employs 
influences that are less relevant to the choice between candidates and drives out influences that 
are more relevant.”).  However, critics believe that limitations of private campaign spending 
restrict free speech and curtail the flow of information.  See, e.g., Bradley A. Smith, Faulty 
Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 
1049, 1061 (1998) (arguing that any limitations on spending reduce communications). 
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 In a union representation campaign, the union is seeking, through an 
election, to represent a group of the employer’s workers.  The union thus has 
incentives to present itself in a positive light.  Like any seller of services, the 
union is trying to persuade its potential customers that they should purchase its 
services.257  Union representatives may use a variety of sales techniques that 
have been passed down through the centuries.  But their incentives are to get 
employees to sign up with the union.  
 The union also has incentives to portray the employer in a negative light.  
After all, the union’s services are simply representing employees in their 
negotiations with employers over terms and conditions of employment.  The 
union must therefore convince employees that the employer is not giving them 
the best terms and conditions that it could.  If a union cannot improve the 
employees’ lot, there is no need for its services.  So the union must convince 
employees that the union could get a better deal.  In making this case, the union 
may bring out information about the employer that may seem negative to 
employees.  For example, the union may argue that the employer’s profit 
margins are extremely high.  The union may argue that the employer is paying 
employees much less than other companies in the field pay their workers.  The 
crux of the case is that the employer is holding back, and the employees need 
the union to maximize their contractual benefits. 
 As Craig Becker has pointed out, the employer is in some respects a third 
party to this transaction.258  Whether I hire Jim to represent me in my 
negotiations with Earl is really no business of Earl’s.  But of course the 
employer often will have a strong interest in seeing the union’s election petition 
defeated.  Union representation may very well mean higher wages and better 
benefits for employees.  It means extensive bargaining sessions with the union 
over the contract.259  If the parties agree to a contract, the employer must inform 
the union of any future changes in working conditions and then bargain over 
those as well.260  If the parties do not agree to a contract, the employer may face 
a strike or unfair labor practice charges for failure to bargain in good faith.  For 
an employer looking to preserve the contractual status quo as well as its ability 
to act independently with regard to employees, there is a very strong interest in 
seeing the union defeated. 
 In such cases the employer will have incentives to disseminate negative 
information about the union.  Of course, what is negative to the employer – i.e., 
the potential for higher wages – is not a negative for the employees.  So the 
                                                          
257 See Estreicher, supra note SE1, at 515 (discussing the market for union representation 
services). 
258 See Becker, supra note CB1, at 498-500. 
259 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2000). 
260 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2000) (requiring employer to inform collective bargaining 
representative of changes to terms and conditions of employment). 
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employer will look to disseminate information about the union that is negative 
from an employee’s perspective.  For example, information about the union’s 
past ineffectiveness, its wastefulness of union funds, and its inability to live up 
to its campaign promises are all useful to the anti-union employer.  The 
employer will also have incentives to paint itself in a positive light.  It will want 
to show that it is giving its employees the best deal it can, and that the union 
will not be able to get any further concessions from the employer. 
 However, the previous discussion assumes an employer that does not want 
union representation.  Although all employers have some incentives to avoid 
unionization, due to the added time and expense imposed by bargaining, 
employers who have the most incentive to defeat the union are those who have 
the most to lose from unionization.  And by extension, those employers will 
therefore put on the fiercest campaign.  However, the employees of such 
employers arguably have the least need to get negative information about the 
union, since the union would more be likely to help them.261 
 The converse is also true.  In those situations where the union is least likely 
to help employees – namely, where the union will not be all that effective in 
improving terms and conditions – the employer has the least incentive to wage 
a vigorous campaign.  These incentives are most skewed when the union has 
favorable relations with the employer.  Obviously, an employer will not 
disseminate negative information about an employer-dominated union.  But 
such unions are illegal under the NLRA, and the Board has the power to 
disempower them (should a claim be filed).262  However, other unions exist 
which are known to be more friendly to employers, and more apt to agree to 
favorable contracts, but their activities may not cross the line into illegal 
collusion.  The existence of so-called “sweetheart” unions is an understudied 
but undeniable part of the union landscape.263  Employers have no incentives to 
campaign against such unions.  In fact, an employer has strong incentives to 
court such unions, especially if there is a possibility of a good-faith union drive 
down the road.  As will be discussed below, with a sweetheart union an 
employer could lock its employees into a collective bargaining agreement for 
three years.264 
                                                          
261 In saying this I recognize that there still is a need for negative information about the union, 
even if the employer has a lot to lose from unionization.  The union could still be corrupt or 
ineffective.  My point is that, holding union effectiveness constant, employers have an increasing 
incentive to defeat the union as employee benefits from unionization (due to employer 
concessions) increase. 
262 29 U.S.C. § 8(a)(2) (2000). 
263 Michael J. Goldberg, Cleaning Labor’s House: Institutional Reform Litigation in the Labor 
Movement, 1989 DUKE  L.J. 903, 910-11 (discussing illegal sweetheart contracts).  
264 See Part III.E. infra. 
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 True “sweetheart” deals – ones involving payoffs to union officials – are of 
course illegal.265  But there are gradations in the relationships between 
employers and unions.  A union may simply want to collect a standard set of 
dues easily, and thus will comply with most of management’s demands with 
little fuss.  Unions that have a “friendlier” relationship with management are 
not necessarily pernicious, and may in fact do the best job of representing their 
employees.  But it is nevertheless true that the better the relationship, the less 
likely it is that the employer will campaign against the union.  The desire of the 
employer to provide negative information about the union is related to the 
employer’s fear of unionization.  And because the union and the employer have 
conflicting interests, incentives for the employer to provide negative 
information about the union may be the lowest when structurally the need for 
such information is the highest. 
 
C. Absence of Competition between Unions 
 Markets depend in large part on competition within the market to provide 
the necessary information about the quality of goods and services.266  
Advertising is often centered around a comparison between one product and 
another, attempting to show why the advertised product is superior.  In 
addition, sellers have incentives to provide information based on market 
pressure from other competitors.  If other firms are revealing information about 
their product that consumers find useful, even if that information is mixed, an 
individual firm will be punished by consumers if it does not provide 
comparable information.  If there is only one firm in the market, however, that 
firm will have much greater leverage in setting consumer expectations about the 
level of information disclosure. 
 If more than one union is seeking to represent a group of employees, these 
competing unions will have incentives to provide negative information about 
each other.  But such elections are comparatively rare.  In 2004, the NLRB 
handled 2,565 elections involving only one union, and 154 elections involving 
more than one union.267  Much of this is a result of AFL-CIO guidelines 
restricting member unions from competing against each other.  Under Article 
XX of the AFL-CIO Constitution, member unions are not permitted to organize 
or attempt to represent employees that are already represented by another AFL-
                                                          
265 See 29 U.S.C. § 186 (2000) (outlawing payments from employers to unions or union officials). 
266 See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note SW1, at 668 (arguing that information regulation is not 
necessary in a competitive market). 
267 National Labor Relations Board, Sixty-Ninth Annual Report 16 (2005), available at: 
http://www.NLRB.gov/NLRB/shared_files/brochures/Annual%20Reports/2004%20WholeAnnua
lReduced.pdf. 
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CIO union.268  In addition, member unions cannot disseminate information as 
part of an organization campaign that may “adversely affect” the reputation of 
another member union.269  These restrictions provide AFL-CIO monopolies 
over certain groups of employees.270  Such monopolies are not subject to the 
general antirust regulations, as labor unions are specifically exempted from 
federal antitrust laws.271 
 There are good reasons for Article XX and other limitations on union 
competition.  Competition between unions wastes union resources.272  
Moreover, a union can more effectively utilize collective worker power if the 
union represents a large percentage of workers in the industry.273  However, 
there are collateral effects to labor union’s antitrust exemption.  One of those 
effects is that employees cannot comparison-shop between different AFL-CIO 
unions as long as those unions comply with Article XX. 274  As a result, 
employees do not get the kind of comparative information that a marketplace 
with a number of competitors would normally provide. 
  
D. Absence of Reputational Intermediaries 
 Information problems may sometimes be resolved not by the parties to the 
contract themselves, but rather through “reputational intermediaries.” 275  
Although critics of mandatory disclosure recognize that firms may have 
inadequate incentives to disclose information, they argue that the demand for 
information will create a market for that information.276  Although the market, 
through interactions between sellers and buyers, is best equipped to determine 
                                                          
268 AFL-CIO Const. art. XX, §§ 2, available at: http://www.afl-
cio.org/aboutus/thisistheaflcio/constitution/art20.cfm. 
269 Id. § 5. 
270 Labor unions are permitted to monopolize employee representation under the Clayton Act.  
See Clayton Act, § 6, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 17). 
271 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2000); see also id. §§ 52 &102 (prohibiting injunctions against labor unions).  
In addition, some labor-employer agreements are given a nonstatutory exemption from antitrust 
sanctions.  Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965). 
272 AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR, AFL-CIO NO-RAIDING AGREEMENT 5 (1954) (finding that 
union raids are “a drain of time and money far disproportionate to the number of employees 
involved”). 
273 Kye D. Pawlenko, Reevaluating Inter-Union Competition: A Proposal to Resurrect Rival 
Unionism, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 651, 680 (2006). 
274 For a proposal to amend Article XX and increase union competition, see Brian Petruska, 
Choosing Competition: A Proposal to Modify Article XX of the AFL-CIO Constitution, 21 
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMPL. L.J. 1 (2003).  For a broader argument in favor of union competition, see 
Pawlenko, supra note KP1. 
275 Black, supra note BB1, at 787. 
276 See, e.g., HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); George J. 
Bentson, The Effectiveness and Effects of the SEC’s Accounting Disclosure Requirements, in 
ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 23, 24 (Henry G. Manne, ed. 
1969); George Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. BUS. 117 (1964). 
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what information is necessary to disclose, 277 sometime sellers will not be in a 
position to provide trustworthy or verifiable information to potential buyers.  
While acknowledging that information about securities may be more difficult to 
verify, critics of mandatory disclosure argue that securities are not unique in 
this regard.  According to one set of commentators, the “lemons” argument 
proves too much, as it is also hard to verify claims about the efficacy of 
toothpaste or the pricing of funeral services.278  So without mandatory 
disclosure, it is claimed, the securities markets would not dry up; instead, 
issuers would use market approaches to create trustworthy information.279 
 How would this happen?  Issuers would voluntarily disclose all of the 
information that investors would need in order to buy the stock at a proper 
price.  If a company refused to disclose, investors would be justifiably wary, 
and the prices for their securities would drop precipitously.280  However, 
Akerlof’s “market for lemons” thesis assumes that the information about the 
product is hard to verify.  If there is no system in place for mandatory 
disclosure and governmental penalties for failing to do so, then investors may 
be concerned about the quality of the information they receive.  And Akerlof’s 
downward spiral could kick in.  Rather than relying on the threat of government 
enforcement to assure the quality of information disclosed, issuers would have 
to find a private way to assure investors of information quality.281  This is 
where reputational intermediaries come in.  These market players would sell 
their reputations as honest, impartial, and savvy investigators as a means of 
checking against issuer fraud.  Even with our system of mandatory disclosure, 
our securities market still places vital tasks in the hands of reputational 
intermediaries.  Accounting firms provide independent audits of the firm’s 
financial health.  Investment banks provide further verification by acting as 
underwriters and thus vouching for the security.  Attorneys comb through the 
issuer’s disclosures to make sure they comply with the relevant law.  And 
research analysts pore over the disclosures and then report their impressions to 
clients, financial media outlets, and/or the investing public. 
                                                          
277 See, e.g., HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF 
A PURPOSE 119 (1979) (“A disclosure will be supplied voluntarily by issuers interested in the 
capital markets when there is consensus among suppliers of capital or other transactors in the 
capital market that this information is necessary to them for lending and investment decisions.  
Issuers will supply it because the alternative is to forego access to the capital markets.”). 
278 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note EF1, at 681, 714. 
279 See Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Why Should Disclosure Rules Subsidize Informed Traders?, 
16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 417, 418-19 (1996) (using the Coase theorem to argue that investors 
will bargain for the appropriate level of fraud-prevention measures). 
280 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note EF1, at 683 (“If the firm simply asked for money 
without disclosing the project and managers involved, . . . it would get nothing.”). 
281 See id. at 675 (discussing the use of “outsiders” to verify company financial information). 
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 There is no denying the importance of reputational intermediaries, or 
“gatekeepers,”282 to the proper functioning of the securities markets.  
Reputational intermediaries have been blamed for the failures of the 2001-2002 
corporate scandals,283  and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 endeavors to shore 
up the ability of accountants and lawyers to serve as informational 
gatekeepers.284  However, much of the current “reputational intermediaries” 
system depends on the law to require or reinforce the provision of those 
services.285  In his blueprint for a strong securities market, Black notes that such 
a market needs not only reputational intermediaries but also laws regulating 
these intermediaries.  For example, one of Black’s eighteen requirements286 for 
controlling informational asymmetry is “[a] sophisticated accounting 
profession, with the skill and experience to catch at least some instances of 
false or misleading disclosure.”287  However, Black also requires “laws that 
impose on accountants enough risk of liability to investors . . . so that the 
accountants will resist their clients’ pressure for laxer audits or more favorable 
disclosure.”288   
                                                          
282 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid”, 57 BUS. 
LAW. 1403, (2002) (defining gatekeeper in the securities regulation context as “reputational 
intermediaries who provide verification and certification services to investors”). 
283 See, e.g., FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE 
FINANCIAL MARKETS (2003); Coffee, supra note JCC1. 
284 Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Reinvention of Corporate 
Governance?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1189, 1189 (2003) (noting that Sarbanes-Oxley “brings into the 
realm of internal governance the gatekeepers that once stood outside the box, including auditors, 
analysts and lawyers”). 
285 For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act imposed rigorous independence requirements on 
accountants.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-1(g) (Supp.) (creating new independence requirements); id. §§ 
7911-7919 (establishing Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)).  The market 
did not require these standards of accountants prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, and yet they are perhaps 
the least controversial aspects of the new law.  But cf. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1533-37 (2005) 
(discussing the mixed quality of empirical evidence about the efficacy of auditor independence).  
Attorneys generally act as intermediaries with respect to legal mandates, including disclosure 
requirements.  In the absence of those mandates, attorneys would only be responsible for insuring 
compliance with private contracts.  The stock exchanges are given special privileges and 
responsibilities by the SEC as self-regulating organizations.  15 U.S.C. § 78(f) (2000) (providing 
for the registration of “national security exchanges”). 
286 See Black, supra note BB1, at 790-99. 
287 Id. at 793. 
288 Id. at 794.  Such laws are necessary because reputation is not always enough.  Certainly, over 
time investors will learn that a particular accounting firm is too superficial in its audits, or that a 
stock exchange fails to require the proper documentation for acceptance.  But just as there can be 
a “lemons” market for securities, there can be a “lemons” market for those who vouch for 
securities.  Investors cannot know precisely how well their reputational intermediaries are doing 
their jobs.  However, slightly more forgiving accountants will be desirable to issuers, who will be 
looking for reputational intermediaries to put them in the best light.  Thus, market forces will 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INFORMATION AND THE UNION REPRESENTATION MARKET           48 
 
 
 Union financial disclosure is governed by the Labor-Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA).289  The Department of Labor 
implements the LMRDA’s requirements through regulations;290 these 
regulations were recently modified to require a greater amount of disclosure.291  
However, the new regulations have been criticized for not requiring unions to 
employ independent or outside auditors.292  By allowing unions to rely on their 
own employees to report sensitive financial data, the LMRDA’s regulations do 
not require an additional set of independent eyes to verify the veracity of that 
data.  Although some large unions do use outside auditors in managing their 
finances, outside auditors are a general regulatory requirement for publicly-
traded companies.293   
 Of course, LMRDA disclosure is designed for those who have already 
joined the union.  An employer may use the union’s disclosures for its own 
campaign purposes, often using the photocopy of the Department of Labor’s 
form to prove its veracity.294  But there is no requirement that employees 
receive what the union discloses to the LMRDA during the course of a union 
representation campaign.  They may not even know of its existence.  The 
NLRB is an independent agency and distinct from the Department of Labor, 
which is an executive branch agency.295  Employees in the midst of a 
representation campaign may not know that there is information available that 
might be useful to their representation decision until after they are already in 
the organization.296 
                                                                                                                                             
drive accountants to be less strict, leading to less confidence from investors in their results.  As 
Black notes: “The result is ironic: The principal role of reputational intermediaries is to vouch for 
disclosure quality and thereby reduce information asymmetry in securities markets.  But 
information asymmetry in the market for reputational intermediaries limits their ability to play 
this role.”  Id. at 788. 
289 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (2000) (also known as the Landrum-Griffin Act). 
290 See 29 C.F.R. §§ 403.1–403.11, 408.1–408.13 (2006). 
291 See Labor Organization Annual Financial Reports, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,374 (Oct. 9, 2003) 
(codified at 29 C.F.R. §§ 403.1–403.11, 408.1–408.13 (2006)). 
292 See Recent Regulation: Department of Labor Increases Union Financial Reporting 
Requirements, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1734, 1734 (2004) [hereinafter Recent Regulation]. 
293 Id. at 1739. 
294 See LOUIS JACKSON & ROBERT LEWIS, WINNING NLRB ELECTIONS: MANAGEMENTS’S 
STRATEGY AND PREVENTIVE PROGRAMS 18-19 (1972) (discussing how employers can use 
LMRDA disclosure in their campaign); ROGER S. KAPLAN & PHILIP B. ROSEN, RESPONDING TO 
UNION ORGANIZING CAMPAIGNS § 6.06 (2002) (same). 
295 For a discussion of the difference between independent agencies and executive branch 
agencies, see Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Judicial Deference to Agency Action: A 
Rational Choice Theory and an Empirical Test, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 431, 445-51 (1996). 
296 In fact, the information is accessible on the Department of Labor’s website.  See Department 
of Labor, LMRDA Reporting and Public Disclosure, available at: 
http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/compliance/olms/rrlo/lmrda.htm.  
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 In addition, there is not the vibrant financial and consumer media that exists 
for other products and services.  According to Black, another critical institution 
for a vibrant securities market is “[a]n active financial press and securities 
analysis profession that can uncover and publicize misleading disclosure and 
criticize company insiders and (when appropriate) investment bankers, 
accountants, and lawyers.”297  As Black noted: 
 
Reputation markets require a mechanism for distributing 
information about the performance of companies, insiders, and 
reputational intermediaries. Disclosure rules help, as do 
reputational intermediaries' incentives to advertise their 
successes. But intermediaries won't publicize their own failures, 
and investors will discount competitors' complaints because 
they come from a biased source. An active financial press is an 
important source of reporting of disclosure failures.298 
 
The press does cover union failures and scandals, and such information is 
obviously relevant to the union representation decision.  However, there is not 
the same level of coverage or sophistication that is applied to information about 
the securities markets.  Nor is there the same sort of attention that is given to 
consumer products through such organizations as Consumer Reports.299  There 
is no “Consumer Reports for Unions.”  For a variety of reasons, it seems 
unlikely that reputational intermediaries such as “union analysts” will emerge 
any time soon.  As AFL-CIO unions do not compete against one another, 
employees looking for AFL-CIO representation generally have one choice.  
Unlike a publicly-traded security, union representation is not sold on a fungible 
national market.  Thus, there is not the money to be made on selling 
information about unions on a national scale.  Additionally, potential union 
members would not be in a position to pay significant sums for the kind of 
serious analysis that stock investors enjoy.  Even if they were, they still might 
not choose to do so given the free-rider problems inherent in obtaining the 
information.  The information would benefit all potential employees at the firm.  
In fact, the purchaser would have an incentive to share it, as the purchaser still 
needs a majority of employees to agree with her if she wishes to prevail on the 
representation question.  But while the benefits will accrue to all, it would be 
difficult to get all to agree to share in the costs.  Given the free-rider concerns, 
                                                          
297 See Black, supra note BB1, at 798. 
298 Id. 
299 A search of the Consumer Reports website revealed no information about unions.  See 
Consumer Reports Search Results for “Unions,” available at: 
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/search.htm?query=unions (finding almost exclusively 
results about credit unions). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INFORMATION AND THE UNION REPRESENTATION MARKET           50 
 
 
information that would be efficient for all to obtain might not be efficient for 
only one to obtain. 
 In sum, the role of reputational intermediaries in supplying information to 
other markets is not replicated in the union representation market.  Their 
absence is yet another reason for concern about the information employees 
receive. 
 
E. Difficulty of Exit 
 A corporate shareholder traditionally has two options if unsatisfied with the 
direction of the company.  The shareholder can either vote for new directors or 
sell the shares to someone else.  The alienability of shares is a critical part of 
bundle of shareholder rights.300  The ability to get out of the investment gives 
shareholders an escape hatch in case they become dissatisfied down the road.  
In the market for union representation, the consequences of buying into the 
union are quite different. The most obvious difference is that the purchase of a 
stock gives the buyer something to resell, while a purchaser of services 
generally can only stop buying the services.  In that sense, exit may be easier 
for the purchaser of services, because there is no need to find someone else to 
buy it from you.  However, service contracts can have lengthy time periods, in 
which exit prior to the specified close can be quite expensive. 
 When a majority of employees vote in favor of a particular union during a 
representation election, they are choosing that union to represent them in 
collective bargaining.  Once selected, the union serves as that representative 
indefinitely.  In order to stop buying the union’s services, employees must vote 
out the union through a decertification election.301  As in the representation 
election, a decertification election will only be conducted if the petitioner can 
show that at least thirty percent of the employees in the bargaining unit are in 
favor of such an election.302  The NLRB then conducts a secret ballot election 
and decertifies the union if a majority votes to decertify. 
 The decertification process is not easy; it takes time to collect signatures for 
the petition, hold the actual election, and then resolve any disputes over pre-
election conduct.  However, the statute also provides that no election can be 
held within a year after an election has been held.303  In the representation 
context, the Board has extended this ban until a year after it has actually 
certified the union as bargaining representative.304  The Board will consider any 
                                                          
300 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 439, 439-40 (2001) (noting that transferable shares are one of the five “core functional 
features” of the corporate form). 
301 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2000). 
302 NLRB Rules and Regs. § 102.61. 
303 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (2000). 
304 Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954). 
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decertification petition filed within a year of certification to be untimely.305  
The contract for union services therefore has at a de jure one-year minimum 
term.306 
 If the union and the employer agree to a contract, the Board imposes an 
additional “contract bar” on potential decertification elections.  Under the 
contract-bar doctrine, employees are prohibited from filing a decertification 
petition during the life of a negotiated collective bargaining agreement.307  Once 
the union and employer have agreed to terms, the employees must retain the 
union for the life of the contract.  The contract bar lasts a maximum of three 
years, even if the agreement goes beyond that.308  However, the agreement need 
not be ratified by members in order to have preclusive effect, unless the 
agreement by its terms requires such approval.309 
 Of course, if the union and employer keep negotiating agreements, making 
sure to have a new contract before the other one expires, the employees would 
never have an opportunity to decertify the union.  Thus, the Board has created a 
thirty-day window in which decertification petitions may be filed.  The Board 
will consider a petition timely if it is filed no more than ninety days, but no less 
than sixty days, before the expiration of the agreement.310  The Board created 
the sixty-day cutoff in order to give the union a period of negotiation “free from 
the threat of overhanging rivalry and uncertainty.”311  Although there are some 
exceptions to the contract-bar doctrine, they generally involve an illegal clause 
in the contract312 or union incapacity through schism or defunctness.313 
 The one-year and contract-bar rules are most dangerous when there is 
collusion between the employer and the union.  Under such circumstances the 
employer and the union can agree to a contract and prevent the employees from 
voting out the union for up to three years.314  However, even when a union is 
merely incompetent, employees would still be stuck with a poor bargaining 
representative for a lengthy period of time. 
                                                          
305 See Chelsea Indus., 331 N.L.R.B. 1648 (2000). 
306 Since it will take some time between the filing of the petition and the decertification election, 
the bar is actually longer than a year.  Employers are not allowed to withdraw recognition after a 
year based on a decertification petition presented to the employer before the year’s end.  Id. 
307 See Cind-R-Lite Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 1255 (1979). 
308 General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1962). 
309 See Stur-Dee Health Prods., 248 N.L.R.B. 1100 (1980); Appalachian Shale Prod. Co., 121 
N.L.R.B. 1160 (1958). 
310 See Leonard Wholesale Meats Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1962). 
311 Deluxe Metal Furniture Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 995, 1001 (1958) (quotations omitted). 
312 See HARDIN & HIGGINS, supra note PHH1, at 527-29. 
313 See id. at 535-38. 
314 See G. Robert Blakey & Ronald Goldstock, "On the Waterfront": RICO and Labor 
Racketeering, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 341, 344 (1980) (recognizing that the contract-bar rule 
allows the employer and union to benefit from a "sweetheart" contract). 
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 The Board does allow an alternative to decertification for removing a union 
from representation.  An employer may refuse to bargain with a union if the 
union has in fact lost the support of a majority of the employees.315  This 
standard replaced the old rule which permitted employers to cease negotiating 
based on a “good faith reasonable doubt” that the union had continuing 
majority support.316  Under the new standard, an employer may cease to 
negotiate with the union if it can prove that the union no longer enjoys majority 
support.317  However, this exit must operate through the employer; it is 
therefore unavailable in situations of employer-union collusion.  Once again, 
we have a situation where the employer has exactly the wrong incentives for its 
participation in the process. 
 There are substantial policy reasons for making it difficult for employees to 
decertify a union.318  However, such difficulties also impose a cost.  Because of 
the difficulties of exit, there is a higher premium placed on employees’ ability 
to make the correct decision at the beginning. 
 
F. No Policing of Misrepresentation 
 As discussed previously,319 the Board has held that misrepresentations do 
not violate the Board’s “laboratory conditions” as long as such 
misrepresentations are not akin to forgery.320  In summarizing the rationale for 
its policy, the Board stated: 
 
In addition to finding [a more restrictive] rule to be unwieldy 
and counterproductive, we also consider it to have an unrealistic 
view of the ability of voters to assess misleading campaign 
propaganda. As is clear from an examination of our treatment of 
misrepresentations under the Wagner Act, the Board had long 
                                                          
315 Levitz Furniture of the Pacific, 333 N.L.R.B. 717, 717 (2001). 
316 See Allentown Mack Sales & Services v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998). 
317 In order to allow for employers to determine this in the face of questions about union support, 
the Board allows for the employer to petition for a decertification election based on “good faith 
reasonable uncertainty” about the continuing majority status.  Levitz, 333 N.L.R.B. at 717, 723.  
However, an employer is allowed to poll its employees if it has good faith reasonable doubt about 
continuing majority status.  Id. at 723.  Thus, doubt is enough to enable the employer to poll, and 
the poll may provide the employer with evidence that the union no longer enjoys majority 
support.  In the alternative, uncertainty – as evidenced by employee dissatisfaction – will be 
sufficient to allow an employer to call an election as to the union’s continued support.  See id. at 
728-29. 
318 See General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1125 (1962) (discussing “the necessity to 
introduce insofar as our contract-bar rules may do so, a greater measure of stability of labor 
relations into our industrial communities as a whole to help stabilize in turn our present American 
economy”). 
319 See Part I.B.2 supra. 
320 Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 131-32 (1982). 
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viewed employees as aware that parties to a campaign are 
seeking to achieve certain results and to promote their own 
goals. Employees, knowing these interests, could not help but 
greet the various claims made during a campaign with natural 
skepticism. The ‘protectionism’ propounded by the [the earlier] 
rule is simply not warranted. On the contrary,  . . . ‘we believe 
that Board rules in this area must be based on a view of 
employees as mature individuals who are capable of 
recognizing campaign propaganda for what it is and discounting 
it.’321 
 
 A hands-off policy towards the hurly-burly world of political campaigns 
might be an appropriate one.322  However, such a stance is anathema in the 
world of contracts, where fraud is universally prohibited.  Common law fraud 
prohibits deception that leads to reliance, and in some circumstances even a 
failure to disclose can constitute deception.  However, many contractual 
regulatory schemes have developed stricter prohibitions against 
misrepresentations.  In the securities context, for example, federal securities law 
has several express and implied causes of actions against misrepresentations.323  
Perhaps the most important antifraud provision is Rule 10b-5, which prohibits 
misrepresentations or misleading omissions in the context of the purchase or 
sale of a security.324  Rule 10b-5 offers substantially more protection against 
misrepresentations than traditional common law fraud.325  There has been little 
controversy about Rule 10b-5’s basic mission: to eliminate misrepresentations 
and misleading omissions in the market for securities.326   
                                                          
321 Id. at 132 (quoting Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311, 1313 (1978)). 
322 See Evan Richman, Note, Deception in Political Advertising: The Clash Between the First 
Amendment and Defamation Law, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 670 (1998) (noting the 
lack of regulation for misrepresentations in the political arena). 
323 In addition to Rule 10b-5, which prohibits misrepresentations or omissions in connection with 
the purchase or sale of a security, § 11(a) of the Securities Act, see 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2000), 
prohibits a false statement of a material fact in a registration statement, and § 12(a)(2) of the Act, 
see id. § 77l(a)(2), imposes liability for a false statement of material fact in a prospectus. 
324 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006). 
325 See Matthew T. Bodie, Aligning Incentives with Equity: Employee Stock Options and Rule 
10b-5, 88 IOWA L. REV. 539, 595-96 (2003). 
326 Commentators on both sides of the mandatory disclosure debate agree that securities markets 
need strong antifraud protection.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 486-89 
(5th ed. 1998) (arguing that many aspects of securities regulation may impede the flow of 
information to investors, but noting that investors should be protected from fraud); Alan R. 
Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 130 
("A critical adjunct to my proposal of disclosure choice is that issuers in public offerings would 
be subject to a mandatory antifraud standard--namely, Rule 10b-5 liability.").  Cf. Jonathan R. 
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV. 347, 390 (1991) 
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 Thus, unlike pretty much any other product market, there is no check 
against fraud in the market for union representation services, except in the very 
narrowest of circumstances.  This failure to police against fraud is yet another 
reason for concern about the quality of information available to employees. 
 
G. Lack of Public Confidence 
 The percentage of private employees represented by unions has steadily 
declined from the 1950s up until this year.327  These declines come in the face 
of polls showing overall public support for unions.  For example, recent polls 
show that a majority of the public approve of labor unions and believe that 
unions are good for the economy.328   However, there is some evidence of 
concerns about union competence.329  According to one public poll, seventy-
one percent agreed that the government ought to do more to protect union 
members from corrupt union officials.330  Certainly, images of union corruption 
have inundated the public since the 1950s.  The 1957-1958 Senate hearings on 
union corruption, chaired by Senator John McClellan and staffed by Robert 
Kennedy, brought to light many instances of union corruption, including ties 
with organized crime.331  Episodes of malfeasance by union officials continue.  
Congress, courts, and commentators have struggled with the best methods of 
curtail such corruption and have resorted to such extraordinary measures as 
forced judicial trusteeships with no set time limits.332  While the federal 
government has had significant success in removing organized crime from 
certain unions,333 the shadow remains.  And in the popular media, shows such 
                                                                                                                                             
("The social value of preventing fraud in the sale of securities is too clear to require 
elaboration."). 
327 See BLS News Release, supra note 1. 
328 See, e.g., Heather Mason Kiefer, Public Remains Positive About Labor Unions, Sept.13, 2005, 
available at: http://poll.gallup.com/content/default.aspx?ci=12751 (showing that 58 percent 
approve of labor unions and 54 percent believe that unions are good for the U.S. economy); John 
Zogby et al., Nationwide Attitudes Toward Unions, Feb. 26, 2004, available at: 
http://psrf.org/info/Nationwide_Attitudes_Toward_Unions_2004.pdf  (public poll finding that 63 
percent approve of labor unions). 
329 SEIU President Andy Stern recently opined that “unions have an image of being old, not 
effective, in some cases not looking like the new work force.  So we have an image problem.”  
Kris Maher, Are Unions Relevant?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2007 at R5 (interview with Andrew 
Stern). 
330 Zogby et al., supra note JZ1, at 15. 
331 Michael J. Nelson, Note, Slowing Union Corruption: Reforming the Landrum-Griffin Act to 
Better Combat Union Embezzlement, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 527, 532-37 (2000). 
332 For an in-depth discussion of two such trusteeships, see Clyde W. Summers, Union 
Trusteeships and Union Democracy, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM  689 (1991) 
333 Jim Jacobs has extensively discussed the federal government’s role in eliminating mob 
influence from unions extensively.  See, e.g., JAMES B. JACOBS, MOBSTERS, UNIONS AND FEDS: 
THE MAFIA AND THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (2005); James B. Jacobs et al., The RICO 
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as “The Sopranos” portray unions as mere vessels for mafia control of certain 
industries.334 
 In the capital markets, mandatory disclosure has been called upon to shore 
up public confidence in securities.  The need for public confidence was touted 
as a key purpose for the New Deal securities legislation335 and has been cited 
repeatedly as justification for further mandatory disclosure.336  The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act was perhaps in large part an effort to restore investor confidence 
after the shocks of 2001 and 2002.337  Although some commentators have 
criticized the lack of empirical support for this justification,338 there is no 
question that market confidence encourages investment in equities.339  In fact, 
the system of public securities regulation could be considered a government 
subsidy to investors and issuers.  By taking steps to insure the integrity of the 
markets, the government saves investors and issuers enforcement costs that 
they would otherwise bear.  Our securities market would not be as strong 
without this system of public intervention.340 
 Mandatory disclosure will not prevent fraud; the securities markets amply 
demonstrate that.  But mandatory disclosure creates a market environment that 
is richer in information and less susceptible to breed the most overt kinds of 
fraud.  Such an environment will help boost public confidence in the market 
itself.  Just as mandatory disclosure has been employed to improve public 
confidence in the securities markets, it may be useful in boosting public 
confidence in the market for union representation.   
  
 
PART IV: PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON ADDRESSING THE INFORMATION GAP 
 
 Given the rampant information difficulties in the market for union 
representation, it makes sense to consider ways in which those difficulties may 
                                                                                                                                             
Trusteeships After Twenty Years: A Progress Report, 19 LAB. LAW. 419 (2004); James B. Jacobs 
& Ellen Peters, Labor Racketeering: The Mafia and the Unions, 30 CRIME & JUST. 229 (2003). 
334 The Sopranos (HBO broadcast, 1999-2006). 
335 Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. 
L. 1, 51 (1983). 
336 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note EF1, at 692 (“The justification most commonly offered for 
mandatory disclosure rules is that they are necessary to ‘preserve confidence’ in the capital 
markets.”). 
337 Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for 
Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 470 (2003) (stating that the August 2002 financial 
statement certifications required under Sarbanes-Oxley helped convince investors that firms as a 
whole were not dishonest or poorly-run). 
338 Id. at 693. 
339 Id.  
340 See Black, supra note BB1, at 782-85. 
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be resolved.  The traditional answer would be to force the information out into 
the market through a system of required disclosure.  Systems of mandatory 
disclosure, however, are not a panacea: they create costs and may change 
market dynamics in inefficient ways.  Below is a preliminary discussion of 
possible approaches to the information problems in the market for union 
representation. 
 
A. Required Disclosure 
 As noted earlier,341 the Board has focused primarily on the exclusion of 
certain kinds of information or speech from the representation campaign; it has 
not made efforts to insure the inclusion of relevant information.  The only 
instance of required disclosure is that employers must provide the union with 
the names and addresses of employees in the unit once the election petition has 
been filed.342  In explaining why it was requiring this information, the Board 
noted: 
 
. . . [W]e regard it as the Board's function to conduct elections . . 
. that are free not only from interference, restraint, or coercion 
violative of the Act, but also from other elements that prevent or 
impede free and reasoned choice.  Among the factors that 
undoubtedly tend to impede such choice is a lack of information 
with respect to one of the choices available.343 
 
Despite the Board’s recognition that a lack of information impedes free and 
reasoned choice, it has done little to address the problem. 
 The most obvious solution to information deficiencies would be a system of 
mandatory disclosure.  Such a system would directly force out material 
information into the marketplace.  However, there are significant concerns 
about the efficacy of such a system, as well as its costs.  Below I address some 
of the more prominent issues raised by mandatory disclosure. 
 1. The exact nature of the information problem.  A system of mandatory 
disclosure must be designed to address the specific information problems the 
disclosure is designed to address.  This article has discussed a number of 
difficulties in the market for union representation: information asymmetry, 
conflicts of interest, lack of competition, lack of reputational intermediaries, 
difficulty of exit, lack of fraud protection.  Each problem creates a different set 
of informational problems.  The conflict of interest problem, for example, 
relates to a specific set of union-employer relationships in which the union has 
                                                          
341 Part I.B.3 supra. 
342 Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1239-40 (1966). 
343 Id. at 1240 (emphasis added) (quotations and citations omitted). 
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been captured, to some degree, by the employer.  Smaller, non-AFL-CIO 
unions are more likely to fit this profile.  The lack of competition, on the other 
hand, relates to a problem that is most exacerbated when only AFL-CIO unions 
serve a particular community of employees.  Any consideration of regulations 
would have to disentangle these different problems. 
 In addition, it is important to keep an eye the collateral effects the 
regulation would have.  The overall problem is lack of information leading to 
(potentially) irrational decisions.  But dealing with this problem could have 
effects on other issues.  For example, greater disclosure requirements could lead 
to fewer employees choosing unionization.  On the other hand, if union 
disclosure were coupled with required employer disclosure, a card-check 
certification systems could become more popular.344  Depending on one’s 
ultimate policy preferences, the costs and benefits of regulation with regard to 
information problems may be outweighed by the costs and benefits such 
regulation creates for unionization and industry overall.  But the effects of any 
system must be considered in its entirety, and the effects of certain policies 
(such as disclosure) could be balanced by reforms in other areas (such as card-
check certification). 
 2. Existing disclosure regimes.  One consideration when contemplating 
creating a system of disclosure is the fact that, for certain types of union-related 
information, the Board could piggyback on top of the existing regime of 
disclosure under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 
(LMRDA).  LMRDA requires extensive union reporting on union finances, 
employee and officer pay, and dues.345  This information is available for public 
use and now can be found on the web.  But employees in the midst of a 
representation campaign are not directed to this information.  The Board may 
be able to use the already-available pool of disclosed information in shaping 
their new disclosure regime. In addition, if policymakers wanted to consider a 
disclosure regime for employers, such a regime could draw upon the extensive 
system of securities regulation required of public companies. 
 3. Informational overload and the marginal employee.  Information 
overload has been a regular concern in the realm of information disclosure. 
Commentators regularly note that too much information can be the equivalent 
of no information.  More damagingly, information overload may drown out 
information that would otherwise be accessible.346  In crafting an information 
disclosure regime, commentators would need to be sure not make the 
information accessible and understandable, or risk conducting a fruitless 
exercise. 
                                                          
344 See Part II.C. 
345 See Part III.D. 
346 See Edwards, supra note ME1, at 229-34; Paredes, supra note TP1, at 444-49. 
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 At the same time, some commentators contend that the problem of 
information overload has been exaggerated.347  Given the importance of the 
marginal consumer in shaping the market, additional information may be 
effective even if only one consumer avails herself of it.  In the context of the 
representation campaign, the marginal employee makes the difference as to 
whether the employees choose the services or not.  Thus, the marginal 
employee is perhaps even more critical to the market for union representation 
than in a traditional consumer market. 
 One might envision a much more active Board which served as a repository 
for information about the campaign and took steps to make sure employees 
received that information.  For example, the SEC plays such a role with 
corporate disclosure: its EDGAR system offers free and simple access to 
millions of corporate documents regarding IPOs, annual statements, and proxy 
contests.348  The Board could offer two levels of information: one short form 
given to all employees, and a database available to all but used only by a small 
group.  This bifurcation might insure the optimal level of information 
dispersion among employees.  This is but one option that should be considered 
in addressing information problems.349 
 
B.  Information and the Neutrality Agreement 
 This article has focused on the concerns about information deficiencies in 
the market for representation services.  In considering this market, it is 
important to note that private neutrality agreements are an increasingly popular 
way for unions to sign up new members.  The neutrality agreement is a contract 
between a union and an employer in which the employer agrees to remain 
neutral while the union endeavors to win the support of a majority of 
employees.  Such agreements come with a range of procedures.  The simplest 
of these agreements only requires employer neutrality during the campaign, 
with the union then having to succeed in a Board-run election to obtain 
representation.  However, some neutrality agreements also require the employer 
to recognize the union if it obtains signatures on representation cards from a 
majority of employees.  This process is known as a card-check certification.  
                                                          
347 See, e.g., Schwartz & Wilde, supra note SW1, at 675-76. 
348 See SEC Filing & Forms (EDGAR), available at: http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml. 
349 A focus on information disclosure would also change the Board’s approach in less obvious 
ways.  For example, the Board’s General Counsel is encouraging the Board to hold that an 
employer and a union may not agree to terms and conditions of employment prior to the union’s 
certification as representative, even if this agreement is conditional on a showing of majority 
support.  See Jonathan P. Hiatt & Craig Becker, At Age 70, Should the Wagner Act Be Retired?: 
A Response to Professor Dannin, 26 BERKELEY J. EMPL. & LAB. L. 293, 301 (2005).  However, 
such agreements provide employees with a true sense of the consequences of unionization.  As 
one set of commentators noted, “[s]uch prerecognition bargaining allows an informed choice by 
both employers and employees.”  Id. at 303. 
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Card-check certification essentially allows the parties to opt out of the NLRB’s 
representation policies.  Unions began negotiating neutrality agreements in the 
1970s and their popularity has substantially increased.350 
 The attraction of neutrality agreements for unions is clear.  A recent study 
of such agreements found that when they included a card check provision, the 
union secured representation of the employees seventy-eight percent of the 
time.351  It is less clear why employers would agree to them.  In many cases, the 
employer has a preexisting relationship with the union as to other employees, 
and it can negotiate a neutrality agreement in the context of a larger series of 
negotiations.352  The most prominent neutrality agreements include ones in the 
auto and telecommunications industries, which have a high union density.353  
Unions have also had some success in securing neutrality agreements through 
corporate campaigns.354  Some state and local government agencies now require 
or encourage employers to sign neutrality agreements in order to be eligible for 
governmental contracts.355  In Las Vegas, the Hotel and Restaurant Employees 
(HERE) and the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) have 
successfully used these tools to obtain neutrality agreements with high profile 
employers.356 
                                                          
350 James Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects for Changing 
Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 829-30 (2005) (asserting that “[a]s a factual matter, Board 
elections have ceased to be the dominant mechanism for determining whether employees want 
union representation”).  Despite this claim, however, Brudney does not contend that unions 
obtain more of their members through certification agreements than through Board elections. 
351 Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Union Organizing Under Neutrality and Card Check 
Agreements, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 42, 52 (2001). 
352 Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Dancing with the Smoke Monster: Employer Motivations 
for Negotiating Neutrality and Card Check Agreements, in JUSTICE ON THE JOB:  PERSPECTIVES ON 
THE EROSION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES (R. Block et al. eds., 2006); 
Roger C. Hartley, Non-Legislative Labor Law Reform and Pre-Recognition Labor Neutrality 
Agreements: The Newest Civil Rights Movement, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 369, 387-89 
(2001). 
353 See, e.g., Rick Haglund, Union Foes Declare War on Neutrality Agreements, GRAND RAPIDS 
PRESS, Feb. 20, 2005, at G5 (discussing neutrality agreement within the automobile industry); 
Matt Richtel, In Wireless World, Cingular Bucks the Antiunion Trend, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, 
at C1 (discussing neutrality agreements at Cingular and SBC Communications). 
354 Eric Heubeck, New Organizing Methods: Card Check and Neutrality Agreements (Nov. 29, 
1999), available at: http://www.enterstageright.com/archive/articles/1299unorg.htm (discussing 
various corporate campaigns). 
355 See Brudney, supra note JB1, at 838 & n.85 (discussing laws, resolutions, or executive orders 
in California, New Jersey, Milwaukee, and San Jose); Hartley, supra note RH1, at 392-95. 
356 Steven Greenhouse, Local 226, “The Culinary” Makes Las Vegas the Land of the Living 
Wage, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2004, at A22; Labor Research Association, Employer Neutrality and 
Card Check Recognition Get Results (October 1999), available at: 
http://www.laborresearch.org/story2.php/67. 
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 Despite their increasing popularity, it is difficult to say how pervasive 
neutrality agreements may eventually become.  Employers who oppose 
unionization will not sign them voluntarily, and to this point unions have only 
been able to apply pressure in a limited spectrum of special circumstances.  In 
addition, Congress has considered legislation to prohibit employer recognition 
based on a card-check majority.357  Although it seems unlikely that such a 
prohibition would pass, the most recent bill did garner fifty-seven co-sponsors.  
Finally, it is unclear whether the NLRB will accord deference to the results of a 
card-check certification mandated by a neutrality agreement.  In a recent order, 
the Board granted review of a case involving the application of the “recognition 
bar” doctrine in the context of a neutrality agreement.358  The Board has 
traditionally recognized that “voluntary recognition of a union in good faith 
based on demonstrated majority status will bar a [decertification or competing 
representation] petition for a reasonable period of time.”359  However, the 
majority in Dana distinguished the traditional rule by noting that such 
precedent “is based upon a union's obtaining signed authorization cards from a 
majority of the unit employees before entering into the agreement with an 
employer, while in both of the instant cases, an agreement was reached between 
the union and the employer before authorization cards, evidencing the majority 
status, were obtained.”360  Although it only granted review on the issue and as 
yet has made no final determination, the order still generated a strong dissent.361  
If the Board ultimately disallows the recognition bar in the card-check 
neutrality agreement context, then employers and employees will be free to file 
decertification petitions soon after the employer has recognized the union 
through the card-check process.362 
 The strongest argument against neutrality agreement is the potential 
impairment of employee free choice.  Anti-union organizations and 
commentators have criticized neutrality agreements as opportunities for union 
                                                          
357 See Secret Ballot Protection Act of 2004, H.R. 4343, 108th Cong. § 3 (2004); H.R. 4636, 
107th Cong. § 2 (2002). 
358 Dana Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1283 (2004). 
359 See id. at 1284 (Liebman & Walsh, Mems., dissenting) (citing Keller Plastics Eastern, Inc., 
157 N.L.R.B. 583 (1966); Sound Contractors Assn., 162 N.L.R.B. 364 (1966)). 
360 Id. at 1283. 
361 See id. at 1284-87 (Liebman & Walsh, Mems., dissenting).  See also Hiatt & Becker, supra 
note HB1, at 300 (arguing that removal of the recognition bar would be “the most radical and 
legally unfounded decision in [the Board’s] history”). 
362 However, it may be possible for union to enforce neutrality agreements through mandatory 
arbitration, which in turn would be enforced by federal courts under § 301 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).  See UAW v. Dana Corp., 278 F.3d 548, 550 
(6th Cir. 2002); AK Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 163 F.3d 403, 406 (6th Cir. 1998); Hotel 
& Restaurant Employees Union Local 217 v. J.P. Morgan Hotel, 996 F.2d 561, 568 (2d Cir. 
1993).  Arbitrators generally have flexibility in crafting remedies for neutrality breaches.  See AK 
Steel Corp., 163 F.3d at 410.  
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intimidation and misinformation to carry the day.363  Critics of card-check 
neutrality agreements have cited the lack of a “fully informed electorate”364 
under such agreements as well as the need for employees to “hear[] views on as 
many sides of the issue as possible.”365  The NLRB itself echoed these concerns 
when it said that “the fact remains that the secret-ballot election remains the 
best method for determining whether employees desire union 
representation.”366   
 Given the concern about informed employee choice, neutrality agreements 
may in fact have a greater need for some system of information disclosure than 
representation elections.  Looking at the parties’ incentives, employers will be 
more likely to sign neutrality or card-check agreements when they are less 
afraid of the consequences of unionization.  And without the pre-election 
campaign, there is no official time for employees as a group to consider their 
collective decision. Taking steps to insure employees have the appropriate 
information may take much of the teeth out of these neutrality-agreement 
critiques.  Thus, in evaluating information regulation in the context of the 
representation election, policymakers should consider the potential for applying 
those regulations in the context of neutrality agreements as well.  Required 
disclosure for card check certifications may alleviate many of the concerns 
raised by such procedures while preserving the features that make them 
attractive to unions and academic commentators. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The Board, courts, and academic commentators have (with good reason) 
focused on employer coercion and administrative delay as key concerns in the 
regulation of the union representation election.  However, the critical role of 
information – information necessary to make an efficient representation 
decision – has been neglected.  This article argues for a new paradigm in 
considering the representation election: the purchase of services.  In applying 
                                                          
363 See, e.g., Compulsory Union Dues and Corporate Campaigns: Hearings on H.R. 4636 Before 
the Subcomm. On Workforce Prots. Of the House Comm. On Educ. & the Workforce, 107th 
Cong. 100 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 House Hearings] (statement of Charles I. Cohen on Oct. 8, 
2002) (arguing that the “ultimate goal” of a card-check neutrality agreement is “obtaining 
representation status without a full informed electorate and without a secret ballot election”); 
Union Free America, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Elections, available at: 
http://www.unionfreeamerica.com/neutrality_cardcheck.htm (“The long and short of it is that 
union authorization cards signed by a majority of employees are not a reliable indication of 
whether they really want union representation.  The unions know this.  That's why they want card 
check elections instead of secret ballot elections.”). 
364 2002 House Hearings, supra note HH2002, at 100 (statement of Charles I. Cohen). 
365 Id. at 105 (statement of Daniel Yager). 
366 Dana Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1283, 1283 (2004). 
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this paradigm, we must determine whether employees making representation 
decisions have the information necessary to make informed and rational 
economic decisions.  There are many reasons to believe that the market fails to 
provide this information, especially in cases where it would be most critical.  
Considering these failures, it is worthwhile to explore ways of dealing with this 
information gap. 
